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SUING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAN THE KING
STILL DO NO WRONG?
Kathleen Howard Mereditht
Jennifer S. Pressmantt
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Tort Claims Act 1 (FTCA or Act) was enacted by Congress in 1946 as a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. 2 The waiver of
immunity provision in the FTCA appears broad and sweeping at first
glance: it provides that the United States "shall be liable [for tort claims]
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances." 3 What Congress gave in one breath, however, it severely restricted in another. By its express terms, the Act exempts thirteen specific classes of tort claims from the waiver of immunity. 4 This
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I.

2.

3.
4.

B.A. summa cum laude, 1975, University of Baltimore; J.D. summa cum laude,
1978, University of Baltimore. Partner, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore,
Maryland.
B.S., 1981, Cornell University; J.D. cum laude, 1989, University of Wisconsin. Associate, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Maryland.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Gerard J. Prud'homme,
Esquire.
Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28
u.s.c. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-78, 2680
(1982)).
Prior to 1946, the United States government could not be sued in tort. The only
relief available to those injured by governmental wrongs was through private relief
bills in Congress. From the early twentieth century on, Congress found itself overwhelmed by thousands of private claim bills, and pressured by a growing number of
courts, commentators, and legislators who criticized the unjust application of sovereign immunity to bar every claim alleging serious injury through governmental acts.
See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. I, 129,229 (192425). In response to public criticism and the deluge of private relief bills, the U.S.
House of Representatives in 1919 introduced a bill to waive sovereign immunity,
with some limitations. See H.R. 14737, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919). Congress considered a version of the bill in every session between 1919 and 1946, when the Act
was finally passed. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the FTCA
and its exceptions, see L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES§§ 51-64 (1988).
The version of the FTCA passed in 1946 shifted review of claims against the
United States government to federal courts. In addition to establishing federal jurisdiction over such claims, the current version of the FTCA provides that the Government consents, with stated exceptions, to suits involving torts committed by
government agents, officials, and employees. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680
(1982).
28 u.s.c. § 2674 (1982).
Section 1346(b) does not apply to any claim:
(a) based upon the exercise or performance of discretionary function by a
federal agency or government employee;
(b) arising out of postal negligence;
(c) regarding tax collection or detention of goods by any law enforcement
officer, including customs;
(d) in admiralty for which a remedy is already provided;
(e) arising during war and related to national defense;
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Article examines how judicial expansion of the exceptions to the waiver
of sovereign immunity has resulted in the dismissal of FTCA claims not
intended by Congress to be barred.
This Article makes no attempt to describe each reservation of governmental immunity, and focuses instead on four situations in which the
reserved sovereign immunity most frequently acts to bar suit: 5 (1) claims
arising out of certain common law intentional torts; 6 (2) claims arising in
a foreign country; 7 (3) suits by service members against the government
where the injuries arise out of or in the course of activity incident to
military service; 8 and (4) claims arising out of the exercise or performance of a discretionary function. 9
After reviewing the judicial expansion of the legislated exceptions to
the FTCA, and the creation by the Supreme Court of an additional exception not enumerated in the FTCA, 10 this Article suggests that courts
have gone beyond the intent of Congress in reserving sovereign immunity
to the federal government. The lack of clear definitions and consistent
interpretation of the exceptions has resulted in both the dismissal of
proper claims and conflicting opinions among lower courts. This Article
concludes that courts should pay greater deference to congressional intent in interpreting the FTCA exceptions, should read those exceptions
more narrowly, and should avoid judicial creation of new exceptions.
Congressional guidance and amendment would help to clarify vague
terms and limit judicial expansion of FTCA exceptions.

5.

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

(f) for damages caused by government quarantine;
(g) repealed;
(h) arising out of 11 enumerated intentional torts, except for several torts
committed by "investigative or law enforcement officers" of the United
States government;
(i) for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by regulation of the monetary system;
(j) arising out of military combatant activities during time of war;
(k) arising in a foreign country;
(I) arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority;
(m) arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company; and
(n) arising from the activities of certain Federal banks.
(paraphrasing 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982)).
While this Article discusses each exception separately, the reader must consider that
more than one exception may arise in the same suit. See, e.g., United States v.
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (claim barred by both intentional tort exception and
Feres doctrine); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242
(E.D.N.Y.) (court considered Feres doctrine, foreign country exception, "combatant
activities" exception and discretionary function exception), appeal dismissed, 745
F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
28 u.s.c. § 2680(h) (1982).
Jd. § 2680(k).
I d. § 2680(j). The scope of Section 2680(j) was expanded by the Supreme Court in
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The doctrine emanating from this decision is known as the Feres doctrine, which is further discussed infra at text and
notes contained in Part IV.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
See supra note 8.
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CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF INTENTIONAL TORTS

The intentional tort exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity
reserves to the government immunity for claims "arising out of" eleven
intentional common law torts, including assault, .battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit and interference with contract rights. 11
Although the exception appears straightforward, inventive lawyers have
found fertile ground for litigation in the "arising out of" language by
framing claims in terms of the government's negligent breach of an affirmative duty to a plaintiff.J2 Inconsistent interpretations of the phrase
"arising out of," and the lack of clear congressional intent in enacting the
intentional tort exception, 13 have resulted in conflicting approaches by
lower courts. 14
In discussing the intentional tort exception, this Article focuses
solely on cases involving the intentional torts of assault and battery.
These cases, more than any others, give rise to claims in which a negligent breach of duty precedes the injurious intentional conduct.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). In 1974 Congress amended section 2680(h) to allow
suits for assault, battery, false imprisonment, abuse of process and malicious prosecution arising out of the tortious acts or omissions of federal investigative or law
·enforcement officers. Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50.
In enacting the 1974 amendment, which expanded governmental liability, Congress
was responding to the apparent injustice in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See S. REP. No. 588, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, as cited in Note, The Talismanic Language of Section 2680(h) of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 243, 254 (1987). In Bivens, federal
narcotics agents conducting a criminal surveillance mistakenly raided the wrong
private dwellings and terrorized the residents. The residents' only remedy was a
private action against the agents. Congress amended section 2680(h) to create a
cause of action against the federal government in such cases. See, e.g., Celestine v.
United States, 841 F.2d 851, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1988) (Veterans' Administration security guard was a "law enforcement officer," and as such, claim of assault and
battery was not barred under section 2680(h)); cf Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 139 F. Supp. 38, 42-43 (D. Md. 1956) (pre-amendment case holding claim
of assault and battery by FBI agents barred by section 2680(h)).
12. See, e.g., Doe v. Scott, 652 F. Supp. 549, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (assault and battery exception of section 2680(h) does not bar suit against the federal government
for negligence of federally employed child care workers where government's breach
of duty to protect children in its care proximately caused children's injuries).
13. The legislative history of section 2680(h) has been described as "sparse," United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985), and "meager," Panella v. United States,
216 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1954).
14. Compare Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 395-96 (4th Cir. 1986) (Section
2680(h) "draws no distinction for cases involving a 'affirmative duty' owed by government to plaintiffs") with Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1988)
("Where the government affirmatively assumes a duty to the victim prior to the
assault, and the government breaches that duty causing injury to the victim, we
cannot say that her claim arises out of the assault. Rather, it rises out of the breach
of that affirmative duty.").
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Historical Background of the Intentional Tort Exception: The
Employee/Nonemployee Approach

The legislative history of section 2680(h), sparse as it is, provides
some support for allowing a claim when the negligence of the federal
government results in an assault and battery. While there is little indication that Congress gave much thought to such claims, what discussion
there was reflects that Congress never intended to bar claims for negligently caused assaults and batteries. 15
The lack of clear congressional intent, however, led some courts to
infer that Section 2680(h) barred any negligence claim related in any way
to an assault or battery. 16 The Second Circuit, in response to the confusion surrounding the intended scope of the intentional tort exception,
rejected this interpretation.J7 In Panella v. United States, 18 the court sug15. The only discussion regarding claims of governmental negligence leading to assault
and battery took place during the 1942 hearings before the House Judiciary Committee. In support of allowing such claims, Assistant Attorney General Francis M.
Shea told committee members that an injury caused by governmental negligence
which results in assault and battery would not be barred by the FfCA exception:
Mr. Robinson: On that point of deliberate assault that is where some
agent of the government gets in a fight with some fellow: Mr. Shea: Yes.
Mr. Robinson: And socks him?
Mr. Shea: That is right.
Mr. Cravens: Assuming a C.C.C. automobile runs into a man and damages him then under the common law, where that still prevails, is not that
considered an assault and is not the action based on assault and battery?
Mr. Shea: I should think not. I would think under the common law
rather that would be trespass on the case.
Mr. Cravens: Trespass on the case? Mr. Shea: Yes.
Mr. Cravens: I do not remember these things very well, but it seems to me
there are some cases predicated on assault and battery even though they
were personal injury cases.
Mr. Shea: No; I think under the common law pleading you have the same
writ, but it makes a distinction between an assault and negligence.
Mr. Cravens: This refers to a deliberate assault?
Mr. Shea: That is right.
Mr. Cravens: If he hit someone deliberately?
Mr. Shea: That is right.
Mr. Cravens: Is it not intended to exclude negligent assaults?
Mr. Shea: No. An injury caused by negligence could be considered under
the bill.
Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1942) (emphasis added) (quoted in Note, Section 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Government Liability for the Negligent
Failure to Prevent an Assault and Battery by a Federal Employee, 69 GEO. L.J. 803,
809-810 (1981)) [hereinafter Note, Assault and Battery Exception].
Interestingly, courts which have denied claims of governmental negligence
which culminated in an assault have focused on the first part of Mr. Shea's exchange
with the House Judiciary Committee, but have ignored the last two lines. See
United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d
622, 626 (2d Cir. 1954).
16. See Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 850 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914
(1986); Collins v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
17. Panella v. United States, 60 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1954) ("In construing the Ian-
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gested that a negligence suit against the government be allowed when the
underlying assault is committed by a non-government employee. 19 A
suit to hold the government liable on a negligence theory for assaults
committed by government employees, on the other hand, would be
barred under Section 2680(h). 20
In adopting the employee/nonemployee distinction, the court reasoned that a suit involving an assault by a government employee should
be barred because the negligence claim would be "merely an alternative
form of remedy" to the assault claim. 21 Implicit in the court's reasoning
is the assumption that suits involving assaults by government employees
are grounded in the doctrine of respondeat superior,22 which holds an
employer vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an employee committed within the scope of employment. 23 Further implicit in the court's
reasoning is the belief that federal tort claims plaintiffs would circumvent
the assault and battery exception by framing the complaint in negligence.24 The court's analysis, however, ignores the reality that negligently caused assault and battery involves two separate tort claims-the
first for the government's negligence in hiring, supervising or training its
employee, and the second for the actual assault and battery. The government's negligence is a distinct and actionable tort claim, and not a back
door attempt to avoid the intentional tort exception. 25

18.

19.
20.

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

guage of the Act, we should, on the one hand, give full scope to the Government's
relinquishment of its historic immunity from suit, and on the other hand, avoid
narrowing the provisions which set forth situations in which Congress has seen fit to
retain that immunity. Our object should be to read the Act so as to make it 'consistent and equitable'. . . . It is true that Section 2680(h), retaining immunity against
claims arising out of assault and battery, can literally be read to apply to assaults
committed by persons other than government employees. But we think such a construction out of keeping with the rest of the act.") (citing Feres v. United States, 340
u.s. 135, 139 (1949)).
60 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). In Panella, an outpatient stabbed another patient at a
federal mental hospital. The victim sued the government under the FTCA claiming
that his injury was caused by the negligent failure of security guards to prevent the
assault. The court, in an opinion written by then Judge Harlan, held that section
2680(h) did not bar a claim for a negligently caused assault committed by a nongovernment employee. /d.
/d. at 624-25.
/d. at 624. It should be noted that the Panella approach leads to incongruous and
irrational results. It seems difficult to justify why the government should be held
liable for negligently failing to prevent an assault by a non-government tortfeasor
such as the patient in Panella, over whom the government has little or no control,
and not liable under the same circumstances when the assault is committed by a
government employee, over whom the government does exercise control.
/d.
See, e.g., Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350, 1356 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 449
u.s. 885 (1980).
See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS§ 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984) (employer liable for employee's acts
under doctrine of respondeat superior).
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
u.s. 914 (1986).
For a fuller discussion of the Panella court's flawed reasoning in adopting the em-
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The employee/nonemployee distinction used in Panella and its
progeny has been criticized by courts and commentators alike. 26 In some
respects, the conflict surrounding the employee/nonemployee approach
has shifted to a debate over how to determine when a claim "arises out
of" an intentional tort.

B.

Definition of "Arising Out of" an Intentional Tort: Conflicting
Approaches

Judicial interpretation of the "arises out of" language of Section
2680(h) is conflicting. 27 Some courts interpret this language literally, dismissing any claim in which an assault or battery is a basis of liability. 28
ployee/nonemployee approach, see Note, Assault and Battery Exception, supra note
15, at 814-22 and accompanying notes.
26. See Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 222 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the employee/
nonemployee approach because "it cuts too rough a path and unnecessarily thwarts
congressional intent"); Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir.
1986) (rejecting approach that bases government liability on employee/nonemployee distinction because there is "nothing in the legislative history or in the language of the statute that evinces any congressional purpose to distinguish between
supervised employees and supervised nonemployees"); Thigpen v. United States,
800 F.2d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It has been suggested that such cases can be
distinguished on the ground that the assailant responsible for the actual assault and
a battery was not a government employee .... The difficulty with such a distinction,
however, is that the words 'arising out of assault [and] battery' in § 2680(h) must
mean the same thing whether the assailant is a government employee or not"). See
also Note, The Talismanic Language of Section 2680(h), supra note II, at 263 (calling for legislative amendment and judicial action to recognize that assault and battery is a separate tort and a logically distinct claim from negligent supervision, and
as such, the intentional tort exception should not bar claims of negligent supervision). Note, Assault and Battery Exception, supra note 15, at 817-22 (summarizing
pitfalls of the employee/nonemployee approach).
Supreme Court justices, regardless of whether they support a broad or narrow
interpretation of the exception, also have rejected the employee/nonemployee distinction. In Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988), Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, asserted that "the mere fact that [an assailant] happens to be an
off-duty federal employee should not provide a basis for protecting the government
from liability .... (I]t would seem perverse to exonerate the government because of
the happenstance that [the assailant] was on a federal payroll." !d. at 2455. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the dissent, took the same position although calling for the
opposite result: "This analysis [rejecting governmental liability where the individual tortfeasor is more culpable than the negligent government employee] applies
whether the person committing the intentional tort is a government employee, a
nonemployee, or a government employee acting outside the scope of his office." !d.
at 2460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27. Compare the plurality opinion in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985)
("Section 2680(h) does not merely bar claims for assault and battery; in sweeping
language it excludes any claim arising out of assault and battery. We read this provision to cover claims like respondent's that sound in negligence but stem from a
battery committed by a government employee") (emphasis in original) with Doe v.
United States, 838 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting government's assertion
that any claim "tangentially related to an assault" is barred by section 2680(h) because "courts have long recognized that this language must be construed in light of
the entire statute, to effect its purpose").
28. See Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 395 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Other courts interpret the language broadly, barring claims for assault
and battery, but permitting claims for negligent hiring, supervision or
training of the intentional tortfeasor. 29
In Thigpen v. United States, 30 suit was brought on behalf of two
young girls who had been sexually molested by a Navy corpsman while
they were convalescing from surgery in a military hospital. The suit asserted negligent supervision of the corpsman, who had previously pled
guilty to a charge of indecency with a child. The government claimed
immunity on the ground that the suit "arose out of" assaults or batteries.
The Fourth Circuit held that the intentional tort exception to the waiver
of sovereign immunity "erects a bar to all claims which rely on the existence of an assault or battery by a government employee," whether or not
such conduct forms the sole basis for the claim. 31
In a spirited concurring opinion, however, Judge Murnaghan argued that the claim did not "arise out of" an assault and battery since it
was "based directly on the breach of a clear and recognizable affirmative
duty, owed by the United States to the plaintiff, to protect the plaintiff
from the harmful conduct of others." 32 Judge Murnaghan reasoned that
the category of claims "arising out of" assault and battery is
properly limited to those where the liability of the United States
would effectively be based on vicarious responsibility, through
the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the violent act of another. A claim does not "arise out of" an assault and battery
where it is based directly on the breach of a clear and recognizable affirmative duty, owed by the United States to the plaintiff,
to protect the plaintiff from the harmful conduct of others. 33
29. See Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986).
30. 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1986).
31. /d. at 394. The court found persuasive the Supreme Court's opinion in United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), that the plain language of section 2680(h)
"does not merely bar claims for assault and battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claim arising out of assault or battery. . . . [Section 2680(h) covers]
claims ... that sound in negligence but stem from a battery committed by a Government employee." /d. at 55. In Shearer, four Justices found that section 2680(h)
barred an FTCA claim where the Army's negligence caused the plaintiff's son to be
murdered by another serviceman. Four other Justices held the claim barred by the
Feres doctrine and declined to join Chief Justice Burger's opinion on the intentional
tort exception. /d. at 59-60. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. /d.
The Thigpen court reaffirmed the principle that "[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act
... must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Exceptions to such waivers,
accordingly, receive a generous construction, with ambiguities resolved against
those seeking recovery from the government." 800 F.2d at 394 (citation omitted).
The court also found its prior decision in Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219
(4th Cir. 1981) controlling in barring the claims. The court interpreted Hughes as
establishing that section 2680(h) "not only covers actual claims for assault and battery, as its broad language indicated, [but it] also bars any claim that depends on the
existence of an assault and battery." 800 F.2d at 395.
32. /d. at 398 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
33. /d. Judge Murnaghan nevertheless concurred in the judgment of the court, reasoning that the case fell within the Feres doctrine, which provides that "the Govern-
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Although Judge Murnaghan was unable to persuade his colleagues
on the Fourth Circuit to limit the scope of the intentional tort exception,
the Ninth Circuit adopted a position consistent with his analysis. In
Bennett v. United States, 34 the court held that the intentional tort exception did not bar claims brought on behalf of children who had been sexually abused by a teacher, where the claimants could establish that the
government was negligent in hiring the teacher and in permitting him to
continue his employment. 3s
The Bennett court relied to a great extent on its prior holding in
Jablonski ex rei. Pahls v. United States, 36 where it held the intentional
tort exception inapplicable to claims for injuries sustained in assaults or
batteries which occur as the result of negligent government supervision
of nonemployees. 37 In extending its holding to include negligent supervision of employees, the Ninth Circuit perceived no reason why victims of
government employees should be treated differently than victims of nonemployees.38 Essentially, the court reasoned that it makes little sense to
say that a negligence claim "arises out of" an assault when the perpetrator is a federal employee, but that the same claim does not "arise out of"

34.
35.

36.
37.

38.

ment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen
where the injuries arise out of activity incident to service." See Peres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). The Supreme Court built upon the foundation of
the Feres doctrine in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), where it held that
sovereign immunity of the federal government is not waived where the claims involve "sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." /d. at 59.
803 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986).
/d. at 1503. The teacher, who was employed at a Bureau oflndian Affairs boarding
school, had admitted on his employment application that he had been charged with
a sex offense for which there was still a bench warrant outstanding. The government never investigated the circumstances of the child molestation charge. The
teacher was hired and placed in an Arizona school, where he kidnapped, assaulted,
and raped several schoolchildren while off-duty. /d. at 1502-03.
712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983).
See Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1503 (citing Jablonski ex rei. Pahls v. United States, 712
F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1983) (government responsible for failure to protect patient
at Veterans' Administration hospital from psychiatric patient with known criminal
history)); see also Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d Cir. 1972) (government responsible for failure to protect Job Corps instructor from enrollee known
to be juvenile delinquent and drug addict); Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12, 15
(4th Cir. 1968) (government responsible where probationer alleged that negligence
by U.S. marshall allowed non-government employee with "unsavory reputation" to
assault and torture probationer).
Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504. The court noted that distinguishing between employees
and nonemployees results in a broad grant of immunity inconsistent with the
FTCA's purpose of providing a forum for those injured by the government's negligence. /d. The court noted further that
[t]o construe the assault and battery exception to defeat claims based on
negligence when the negligence amounts to almost reckless disregard in
the hiring and the placement of a known sex offender in charge of children
would violate 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) by treating the federal government
differently from private entities hiring and supervising teachers.
Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504.
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an assault when the perpetrator is a nonemployee. 39 In either case, the
court explained, the appropriate focus is not on the status or conduct of
the perpetrator, but on the negligence of the government in failing to
supervise him, and claims arising from the latter do not "arise out of"
assaults and batteries. 40
The opposite conclusions reached by the courts in Thigpen and Bennett reflect two conflicting approaches to the intentional tort exception. 41
One approach permits recovery for injuries sustained in an assault or
battery at the hands of a government employee, provided the theory of
liability is premised upon negligent hiring, supervision or training. 42 The
second school of thought rejects liability in any case in which assault or
battery by a government employee is essential to the claim. 43
The conflict between these two approaches was recently discussed
39. /d.
40. /d.
41. There is, however, a consensus within the Supreme Court and accord among the
circuits that the intentional tort exception does not bar claims "arising out of" assaults and batteries by nonemployees. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 56
(1985); Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 221 (7th Cir. 1988); Wine v. United
States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (lOth Cir. 1983); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622,
626 (2d Cir. 1954) (Harlan, J.).
In claims of negligent supervision of nonemployees, the claim against the government is based solely on its negligence. The absence of an employment relationship removes the concern that a plaintiff could disguise a respondeat superior claim
as a "negligent supervision" claim. Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 223 (7th
Cir. 1988). But see Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 2460 (1988) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (rationale and intent of Congress to bar claims arising from intentional torts because individual tortfeasor is more culpable applies regardless of
whether tortfeasor is government employee, nonemployee or government employee
acting outside the scope of employment).
42. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986); Doe, 838
F.2d at 223 (Section 2680(h) does not bar claim based on negligence in allowing
unknown assailants to sexually molest children at Air Force day care center, where
government affirmatively assumed duty to victims prior to assault, and government's subsequent breach of duty caused victim's injury); Kearney v. United States,
815 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir. 1987) (Section 2680(h) does not bar claim of negligent
supervision resulting in sexual assault and murder by serviceman); Rogers v. United
States, 397 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1968) (Section 2680(h) does not bar claim based on
negligence by United States marshall in allowing non-government employee to assault and torture probationer); see also supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
43. See Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 394 (4th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. United
States, 788 F.2d 845, 852 (2d Cir.) (Section 2680(h) bars claim based on negligent
supervision of postal worker who sexually assaulted child), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
914 (1986); Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1986) (Section 2680(h) bars claim of negligent supervision and failure to warn resulting in
death of serviceman by three fellow servicemen); Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d
116, 118 (5th Cir. 1985) (Section 2680(h) bars claim based on negligent supervision
of military recruiter who sexually assaulted a potential recruit); Wine v. United
States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (lOth Cir. 1983) (Section 2680(h) bars claim based on
negligent supervision of off-duty serviceman who shot and sexually assaulted plaintift); Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1981) (Section 2680(h)
bars claim based on negligent retention of postal worker who sexually assaulted two
young girls); see also supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.

484

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 18

but not resolved by the Supreme Court in Sheridan v. United States. 44
Sheridan involved a claim against the government arising from an assault
by an enlisted off-duty medical aide. The aide had become intoxicated
and was found unconscious by three Navy corpsmen. The corpsmen
picked the aide up with the intention of taking him to a local emergency
room. The corpsmen fled, however, when the aide regained consciousness, grabbed a rifle and displayed its barrel. They took no further action
to subdue the aide or to notify the proper authorities. Thereafter, the
aide left the building and began shooting at passing cars, hitting the
plaintiffs' vehicle and causing the plaintiff's injuries. 45
A claim for negligent failure to control the aide was brought against
the government. In reversing the decisions of the trial court and the
Fourth Circuit in favor of the government, 46 the Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to adopt the view that any claim which asserts negligence as
a basis for liability independent of assault should survive the intentional
tort exception.
Noting that the FTCA waives governmental immunity for negligent
or wrongful acts of a government employee "acting within the scope of
his office or employment," 47 the Court held that the aide's off-duty conduct was not within the scope of his employment and thus, could not by
itself give rise to governmental liability under the FTCA. 48 Because the
off-duty conduct of the aide did not involve governmental liability under
the FTCA, the intentional tort exception was inapplicable. The basis for
the claim allowed by the Court was not the conduct of the aide, but
instead, the independent negligent failure of the three corpsmen to control the aide. 49
The impact of the Sheridan decision on the intentional tort exception remains unclear. Read broadly, the case appears to dictate that the
government may be held liable for the negligent supervision of a govern44. 108 S. Ct. 2449.
45. Id. at 2451.
46. Both the Maryland District Court and the Fourth Circuit found the Fourth Circuit's prior decisions in Hughes and Thigpen applicable in barring the plaintiffs'
claims. The Fourth Circuit held that the mere fact of government employment required dismissal. Sheridan v. United States, 823 F.2d 820, 822 (4th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988).
In a perceptive dissent, Chief Judge Winter argued that where, as here, "government liability is independent of the assailant's employment status," the independent tort of negligence does not "arise out of" the intentional tort of assault
and battery. Sheridan, 823 F.2d at 824 (Winter, J., dissenting).
47. Sheridan, 108 S. Ct. at 2455 (quoting Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 623
(2d Cir. 1954)).
48. Id.
49. I d. This theory of liability emerged because of the Government's having voluntarily
prohibited possession of firearms on the naval base and voluntarily undertaking responsibility for care of persons "visibly drunk and visibly armed," which in the
Court's view, amounted to a Good Samaritan responsibility distinct from the employment relationship. Id. (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,
65 (1955)).
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ment employee who assaults another unless the assault occurs within the
scope of government employment. Because few cases have involved assaults which truly have occurred within the scope of the wrongdoer's
office or employment, a broad interpretation of Sheridan would virtually
nullify the intentional tort exception and would make it unnecessary to
resolve the conflict raised by Thigpen and Bennett. Conversely, if Sheridan is confined to its facts, it may be interpreted to permit only negligent
supervision claims arising out of assaults by off-duty personnel and
would leave unsettled the conflict raised by Thigpen and Bennett. 50
C.

Future Expansion of the Intentional Tort Exception: Negligent
Supervision as an Independent Basis for Liability.

Insight into future Supreme Court treatment of the intentional tort
exception may be found in the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Sheridan. Three members of the Court-Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
and Scalia-dissented and would have held that where recovery is based
upon injuries "associated in any way" with an assault and battery, the
action "arises out of" that tort and is therefore barred. 51
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but faulted the Court's
analysis. 52 In his view, application of the intentional tort exception
should turn on whether the alleged negligence involved breach of a duty
arising out of the employment relationship or breach of some separate
duty independent of the employment relationship. If the breach arises
out of the employment relationship, he concludes the claim should be
barred. To hold otherwise, according to Justice Kennedy, "would frustrate the purposes of the exception" 5 3 since most intentional torts by government employees "plausibly could be ascribed to the negligence of the
tortfeasor's supervisors." 54 Conversely, Justice Kennedy would allow
claims which allege negligence on the part of government personnel provided the negligence is independent of the employment relationship.
In Sheridan, a legitimate theory of liability existed independent of
the assailant's employment status. The theory of liability did not turn on
the fact that the assailant was a government employee, and would have
been equally sound had he been a patient or a visitor. In Justice Kennedy's view, this distinction dictated a different result and he therefore
concurred in the judgment of the majority. 55 The Court's focus in Sheridan on a separate and independent basis for liability should be expanded
to include such claims as negligent supervision.
50. Under either reading, however, it is clear the Supreme Court has rejected the employee-nonemployee distinction lower courts have relied on in dismissing claims
under the intentional tort exception. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. Sheridan, 108 S. Ct. at 2458-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52. /d. at 2458 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed with Judge Winter's
dissent in Sheridan, 823 F.2d at 823-29. See also supra note 46.
53. 108 S. Ct. at 2458.
54. /d.
55. /d.
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Conclusion

The parameters of the intentional tort exception are not yet fully
defined. The diversity of opinion on the Supreme Court as to its proper
scope creates future uncertainty. Nevertheless, Sheridan provides claimants with hope for avoiding the intentional tort exception in future cases.
III.

CLAIMS ARISING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

Congress has reserved to the federal government sovereign immunity for claims "arising in a foreign country." 56 Absent clear congressional definition of the terms used in this statutory exception, however,
courts not only have experienced difficulty determining whether a claim
"arises" in a foreign country, but have interpreted the term "foreign
country" broadly to include American military bases, 57 American embassies, 58 areas leased to the United States, 59 land occupied or conquered
by the United States during wartime, 60 and any territory outside the geographic boundaries61 or political control of the United States. 62 Judicial
expansion of the foreign country exception has established jurisdictional
limits far greater than intended by Congress, thus resulting in the dismissal of valid claims contrary to the purposes and policies of the FTCA. 63
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982) ("The provisions of (the Federal Tort Claims Act] shall
not apply to ... [a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.").
57. See Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1986) (claim arose in Germany because plaintiff's slip and fall claim arose on American military base in Germany); see also infra notes 104, 107-110 and accompanying text.
58. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir.) (although words "foreign
country" are not words of art carrying a fixed and precise meaning in every context,
common sense dictates that an American embassy on foreign soil is a foreign country), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); see also infra note 103 and accompanying
text.
59. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949) (injury sustained on Newfoundland airfield leased to United States arose in foreign country); see also infra
notes 89-100.
60. See Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604,608 (9th Cir. 1951) (Okinawa considered a
foreign country notwithstanding United States sovereignty during World War II);
see also infra notes 80-87, 102 and accompanying text.
61. See Bell v. United States, 31 F.R.D. 32, 35 (D. Kan. 1962) (foreign country means
all countries other than those within boundaries of United States, its territories and
possessions).
62. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Antarctica not foreign
country under plain meaning of FTCA because neither United States nor any other
foreign nation asserts sovereignty over it); Pignataro v. United States, 172 F. Supp.
151, 152 (C.D.N. Y. 1959) (foreign country is any territory subject to the sovereignty
of another nation); Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(foreign country is any area not a "component part or political subdivision of the
United States"); Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 340, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1948)
(foreign country means anywhere the United States Congress is not the "supreme
legislative body").
63. See, e.g., Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1986) (court lacked
jurisdiction over claim arising from a slip and fall at United States Army base in
West Germany); Broadnax v. United States, 710 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(district court lacked jurisdiction over complaint alleging medical malpractice by
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The United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Spelar64 is the only case in which the Supreme Court has addressed the foreign country exception since the FTCA's enactment in 1946. Since
Spelar, however, lower courts have attempted to reach results consistent
with the narrow outcome of Spelar without regard to the broader purposes and policies of the FTCA and its exceptions.
This section of the Article analyzes various lower court decisions
interpreting the phrase "arising in a foreign country" and suggests that
the most logical definition of the phrase "foreign country" is an area
where United States law could not be applied. 65 In those places where
United States law could be applied, such as American military bases or
embassies, the foreign country exception should be narrowly construed
to allow suits to proceed.

A.

Historical Background of the Foreign Country Exception

The FTCA and its exceptions were the product of numerous drafts
and continuous debate for over twenty-seven years prior to its enactment
in 1946. 66 A 1940 Senate Judiciary Committee version of the bill would
have limited the FTCA to "damages or injuries occurring within the geographic limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the
Canal Zone." 67. The same year, the House Judiciary Committee considered a draft limiting claims to those "arising in the United States or its
territories." 68 Two years later, a draft before the House Judiciary Committee exempted all claims "arising in a foreign country in behalf of an
alien." 69 Because the language of the 1942 draft would have "made the
waiver of the government's traditional immunity turn upon the fortuitous circumstances of the injured party's citizenship," 70 the phrase "in

64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

United States Army doctors at Army hospital in Germany); Gerritson v. Vance, 488
F. Supp. 267, 268 (D. Mass. 1980) (court lacked jurisdiction to review a claim arising from accident occurring on grounds of l!nited States embassy in Zambia).
338 u.s. 217 (1949).
For other proposed definitions of the phrase "foreign country," see Bederman, Exploring the Foreign Country Exception: Federal Tort Claims in Antarctica, 21 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 731, 733 (1988) (the "only sensible definition of[foreign country]
is one that emphasizes the presence or absence of another nation's tort law which
effectively governs the claim") [hereinafter Bederman, Foreign Country Exception in
Antarctica]; see also Comment, The Foreign Country Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 22 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 603, 629 (1989) (the foreign country exception
should be narrowly construed to prohibit cases arising under foreign law, rather
than prohibiting those that arise in a foreign country in a strictly geographical
sense) [hereinafter Comment, FTCA Foreign Country Exception].
See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1949) (FTCA was "the product of
some 28 years of congressional drafting and redrafting, amendment and counteramendment").
See Tort Claims Against the U.S.: Hearings on S. 2690 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 76 Cong., 3d Sess. 38, 65 (1940).
See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm.
No. 1 of the House Judiciary Comm., 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940).
H.R. REP. No. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 303(12) (1942).
Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220.
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behalf of an alien" was removed in a revised version of the bill at the
request of the Attorney General,7 1 The enacted version, like the current
version, merely contained the phrase "arising in a foreign country."
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Spelar, 72 recognized that the
legislative history of the foreign country exception demonstrates that,
although "Congress was ready to lay aside a great portion of the sovereign's ancient and unquestioned immunity from suit, it was unwilling to
subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power." 73 The Court determined that the congressional purpose in
reserving governmental immunity from suits arising in foreign countries
was to protect the United States from being subject to the laws of another
nation.7 4 Accordingly, the Court correlated the coverage of the Act with
the scope of United States sovereignty.
Although the legislative history, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the foreign country exception in Spelar, make clear that Congress sought to protect the United States from liability arising from the
laws of foreign powers, the legislative history fails to reveal a precise definition of the term "foreign country." In fact, Congress rejected earlier
proposals to limit the scope of the FTCA to specific geographic areas
such as the United States or its territories. 75 In rejecting these proposals,
Congress instead adopted language designed to prevent the United States
from being judged by the laws of a foreign country. ·unfortunately, Congress did not define "foreign country" in carving out the exception, and
the Supreme Court has relied on the amorphous concept of "sovereignty" in defining the exception's scope. 76
71. See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 35, 66 (1942). In support of dropping the
phrase "in behalf of an alien," Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea told
members of the House Judiciary Committee that
[c]laims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this bill ...
whether or not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined
by the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict
the bill to claims arising in this country. This seems desirable because the
law of the particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will lead I think
a good deal of difficulty.
/d. at 35 (quoted in Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221).
72. 338 u.s. 217 (1949).
73. Id. at 221.
74. /d.
75. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
76. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 223-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
noted:
To assume that terms like "foreign country" and "possessions" are selfdefining, not at all involving a choice of judicial judgment, is mechanical
jurisprudence at its best. These terms do not have fixed and inclusive
meanings .... Both [terms] have penumbral meanings ....
In the entangling relationships between ... nations ... it is not compelling
that "foreign country" means today what it may have meant in the days of
Chief Justice Marshall, or even in those of Mr. Justice Brown. The very
concept of "sovereignty'' is in a state of more or less solution these days.
To find a single and undeviating content for "foreign country" ... fails to
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The lack of a clear definition of foreign country has left lower courts
scrambling to apply the foreign country exception where the United
States potentially could be exposed to the laws of foreign countries,
rather than limiting the applicability of the foreign country exception to
those cases where the United States would be exposed to the laws of a
foreign country. Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity under the
FTCA was the result of widespread awareness that, with limited exceptions, governmental immunity was not warranted either "as a matter of
principle or as a matter of justice." 77 By mechanically applying the foreign country exception to bar valid claims, courts have not shown an
awareness of "justice." 78 Rather, they have invoked the exception as a
blanket refusal to consider FTCA claims even in the face of rapidly
changing concepts of sovereignty, international relations, and international law.

B.

Definition of "Foreign Country"

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Spelar, 79
lower courts sought to define "foreign country" broadly in order to
achieve the stated congressional policy of reducing the United States government's exposure to suits in foreign countries. For example, in
Straneri v. United States, 80 a federal district court held that a foreign
country was anywhere the United States Congress was not the "supreme
legislative body." 81 Thus, to recover under the FTCA, "the tort must
have been committed on lands within the boundaries of the United States
or its territories or possessions. " 82 The Straneri court rejected a claim
made by a merchant seaman who had been struck by a vehicle driven by
a United States serviceman in Belgium, a country occupied by the United
States Army at the time of the accident. The court reasoned that, because Congress did not have full power to enact laws under which
Belgium and its people would be governed, Belgium was a foreign
recognize the scope of supple words that are the raw materials of legislation and adjudication and is unmindful of those considerations of policy
which underlie, consciously or unconsciously, seemingly variant decisions.
/d.
77. H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76 Cong., 3d Sess. 2, 8 (1940).
78. For a discussion of the judicial deviation from the concepts of "justice" and "fair
play" in deciding cases under the foreign country exception, see Comment, FTCA
Foreign Country Exception, supra note 65, at 622-24.
79. 338 u.s. 217 ( 1949).
80. 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
81. /d. at 241.
82. /d. The Court specified that, regardless of the degree of control exercised by the
United States government, all lands other than the 48 States, the District of Columbia, federal Indian reservations, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
the Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and other Pacific Island possessions, are to be considered foreign countries for the purposes of the FTCA. !d. at 241 n.3. Interestingly, this definition is almost identical to the one contained in an earlier draft of the
Act which was rejected by Congress. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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country. 83
Similarly, in Brunell v. United States, 84 a USO entertainer was injured in Saipan while being transported in an Army jeep operated by a
member of the United States Army. At the time of the accident, Saipan
was in the possession and under the military control of the United States.
Despite United States control of Saipan at the time, and the fact that
Saipan was later made a trustee of the United States, the court "reluctantly"85 concluded that Saipan was a foreign country within the provisions of the FTCA. 86 The court reasoned that Congress intended the
FTCA to apply only to those "areas which were actually a component
part or political subdivision of the United States." 87
These two cases exemplify the overbroad definition of foreign country applied by courts in their resolve to achieve the congressional policy
of avoiding the exposure of the United States to foreign laws. The
Straneri and Brunell courts, however, adopted definitions of "foreign
country" which Congress had explicitly rejected in revising the FTCA in
1946. 88
Similarly, in United States v. Spelar, 89 the Supreme Court enunciated an overbroad definition of foreign country based on the equally
vague term "sovereignty," as that concept was understood in 1949. In
Spelar, a flight engineer employed by American Overseas Airlines was
killed in a takeoff crash at Harmon Field, Newfoundland. The airfield
was one of several leased for ninety-nine years to the United States by
Great Britain. Spelar's estate sued the United States under the FTCA
alleging that the fatal crash was caused by the government's negligent
operation of the airfield. 90 The district court held the claim to be one
"arising in a foreign country," and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the foreign country exception did not bar a suit for wrongful death at an air base under
long-term lease to the United States. 91 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the claim was barred by the foreign country
83. Straneri, 77 F. Supp. at 241.
84. 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
85. /d. Other courts, while sympathizing with the plaintiff's plight, likewise have held
that other FTCA exceptions barred a plaintiff's suit. See, e.g., Scales v. United
States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the Feres doctrine, "reluctantly,"
and "regret[ting] the effects" of the application).
86. Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The court noted that,
although foreign territory occupied by United States armed forces comes under the
sovereignty of the United States, it does not in fact become part of the United States.
/d. at 71. Thus, as under relevant revenue laws, neither military occupation nor
cessation by treaty makes a conquered territory domestic territory, so long as Congress has not incorporated the territory into the United States. /d.
87. Id. at 72.
88. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
89. 338 u.s. 217 (1949).
90. Id. at 218.
91. !d. at 219.
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exception. 92
In barring the claim, the Court relied on two different rationales.
First, the Court pointed to the plain meaning of the phrase "foreign
country." Observing that "[w]e know of no more accurate phrase in
common English usage than 'foreign country' to denote territory subject
to the sovereignty of another nation," 93 Justice Reed, speaking for the
majority, concluded that the claim was barred because the airfield
"where this claim 'arose' remains subject to the sovereignty of Great
Britain and lay within a 'foreign country.' " 94 Second, the Court reasoned that the legislative history behind the foreign country exception
did not support Spelar's claim. 95 In respecting Congress' unwillingness
to subject the United States to "liabilities depending upon the laws of a
foreign power," the Court held that "[t]he present suit, premised entirely
upon Newfoundland's law, may not be asserted against the United States
in contravention of that policy."96
In reaching its decision, the Court distinguished its previous holding
in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 97 where it held that under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the same airfield was a "possession" of the
United States. 98 These inconsistent results were rationalized by the
Court with the explanation that the statutory language and legislative
history of the FTCA were different from that of the FLSA. 99 In further
rationalizing its decision to invoke the foreign country exception, the
Court emphasized the concept of sovereignty and held that the lease of
an air base by the United States from a foreign country does not result in
the transfer of sovereignty. 100
Relying on the legislative history and policies of the foreign country
92. Id.
93. Id. But see Spelar, 338 U.S. at 223-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (criticizing such
a definitional explanation as simplistic).
94. Id. at 219.
95. Id. at 219-21; see also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
96. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221.
97. 335 u.s. 377 (1949).
98. /d. at 390.
99. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 224-25 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson reflected:
If an employee should chance to work overtime on a leased air base, he
can maintain an action for extra wages, penalties and interest, because the
Court finds the air base to be a "possession" of the United States. However, if he is injured at the same place, he may not proceed under the Tort
Claims Act to recover, because the Court finds the air base then to be a
"foreign country."
100. /d. at 221-22. The Court further dismissed any possible inconsistency by stating
that in Vermilya-Brown "we there held no more than the word 'possessions' does
not necessarily imply sovereignty .... " /d. at 222. Moreover, the leased bases were
not in existence at the time the FLSA was passed. Therefore, Vermilya-Brown was
viewed as an attempt to determine what Congress would have done if faced with the
existence of the leased bases when it passed the Act. With regard to the FTCA
foreign country exception, the Court stated that "the Vermilya-Brown problem of
determining what Congress would have done when faced with a new situation does
not exist at all in the present case." !d.
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exception as enunciated in Spelar, courts uniformly expanded the meaning of "foreign country," even as they sidestepped the concept of sovereignty the Supreme Court found so compelling in Spelar. 101 In the years
following World War II, courts repeatedly denied jurisdiction over
claims arising in areas occupied by the United States during wartime,
even when the United States imposed its own laws and regulations during its occupation and later assumed powers of administration through
treaty or United Nations trusteeship. 102
Courts also widened the scope of the foreign country exception by
classifying embassies 103 and military bases 104 as foreign countries.
Although there has been some recent liberalization of the foreign country
exception to allow claims to proceed where the negligent act or omission
occurred in the United States, 105 or in both the United States and a foreign country, 106 that liberalization has not taken place where the foreign
country involved is a military base.
101. See, e.g., Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957) (peace treaty
with Japan did not amount to sovereignty); Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604,
608 (9th Cir. 1951) (Okinawa constituted a foreign country despite temporary
United States sovereignty during World War II), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952).
102. See, e.g., Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir.) (Island of Kwajalein a
foreign country despite United States' occupation and court system), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 936 (1958); Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 721-22 (4th Cir. 1957)
(Okinawa a foreign country because the United States, although exercising sovereignty, did not intend to retain territory permanently); Cobb v. United States, 191
F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1951) (Okinawa a foreign country despite United States
control because, although United States exercised de facto sovereignty, it lacked de
jure sovereignty), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Brunell v. United States, 77 F.
Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Saipan a foreign country despite military occupation
by United States). See generally Bederman, Foreign Country Exception in Antarctica, supra note 65, at 742-45.
103. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir.) (United States Embassy in
Bangkok, Thailand) ("Under Spelar, the words 'in a foreign country' ... must be
read to include the embassy buildings and grounds or liability of the United States
... will be determined by the law of a foreign power, contrary to the purposes of
Congress."), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); Gerritson v. Vance, 488 F. Supp.
267,268 (D. Mass. 1980) (court lacked jurisdiction over claim by plaintiff injured on
grounds of United States embassy in Zambia).
104. See Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1986) (slip and fall claim in
Germany); Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1985) (negligent medical treatment of serviceman's wife at Air Force base in Philippines), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1105 (1986); Broadnax v. United States, 710 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (medical malpractice in Germany); Grunch v. United States, 538 F. Supp.
534, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (negligent medical care in Germany); Bryson v. United
States, 463 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E. D. Pa. I 978) (wrongful death claim in West Germany); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir.) (wrongful death action arising out of airplane crash in waters near United States air base in Okinawa),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Manemann v. United States, 381 F.2d 704, 705
(lOth Cir. 1967) (negligent medical care in Taiwan); Rafferty v. United States, 150
F. Supp. 618, 618 (E.D. La. 1957) (medical malpractice claim occurring on military
base in Germany).
105. See infra notes 118-127 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
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In Heller v. United States, 107 for example, the wife of a U.S. serviceman was negligently treated by military doctors at an Air Force hospital
on an American military base in the Philippines. Upon the couple's return to the United States, the serviceman's wife was diagnosed with inoperable cancer which the military doctors had failed to detect. In a
subsequent wrongful death action, the government was held immune
from suit because the claim arose in a foreign country 108 despite the extensive and near exclusive government control over the military
installation. 109
Although the Congressional purpose of protecting the United States
from being judged in accordance with laws of foreign powers is an appropriate justification for implementing the foreign country exception, application of the exception in many instances leads to incongruous results.
For example, had the patient in Heller been treated in a stateside military
hospital, the government could have been sued successfully. Only the
accident of location protected the government in Heller from responsibility for the wrongful acts of its employees. Consequently, the government's liability turned solely on the fortuity of the serviceman's
assignment.
In today's armed forces, the foreign country exception represents a
bar to countless meritorious claims. Thousands of American service
members are stationed overseas. For the most part, they live on American military installations run by the United States government in accordance with federal laws. Their spouses and children live with them with
the knowledge and approval of the United States government. They
shop at stores owned and operated by the government, and they pay for
goods with American currency. They seek medical treatment at military
facilities run by American doctors in accordance with American standards. In short, overseas military installations are, in reality, enclaves of
American sovereignty. Nevertheless, the foreign country exception remains intact, barring all suits against the government which arise out of
107. 776 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986).
108. /d. at 96-97. In holding the suit came within the scope of the foreign country exception, the Third Circuit relied on the uniform holdings of other appellate courts that
the exception applies to torts committed by military personnel stationed abroad.
The court also interpreted Spelar as requiring two conditions for the exception to
apply: first, the tort must occur in a jurisdiction outside United States sovereignty;
second, the United States must be subject to liability based upon foreign law. /d. at
95-96.
109. /d. at 96. The court rejected the argument that "if the United States exercises any
jurisdiction over its nationals in foreign countries, foreign sovereignty by definition
could not exist." !d. Although the United States maintained sovereignty over its
Philippine military bases after World War II, and by later agreement with the Philippine government, had retained "command and control over its facilities [and] personnel. .. " the court nonetheless found that the two Spelar conditions were satisfied.
/d. n.3 (citing Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
the Philippines Concerning Military Bases, March 14, 1947, as amended January 7,
1979, 30 U.S.T. 863, 879, T.I.A.S. No. 9224).
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activities in foreign countries. 110

C.

Determining When a Claim "Arises in" a Foreign Country

In order to determine whether the foreign country exception applies,
courts must decide where the claim arose. 111 Under the FTCA, a tort
claim "arises" where the alleged negligent act or omission "occurred." 112
In Richards v. United States, 113 the Supreme Court held that liability
under the FTCA is decided under the law of the place where the negligent act or omission occurs, not the law of the site of the injury or the
place where the negligence has its "operative effect." 114 Therefore,
where a negligent act t!lkes place in a foreign country, but results in an
injury in the United States, the claim "arises in a foreign country" and is
barred by the foreign country exception. 115 If, however, the negligent act
occurs in the United States, even though the act had its "operative effect"
in a foreign country, the claim does not fall within the foreign country
exception. 116
Judicial construction of the foreign country exception generally has
centered on the meaning of "arising in," and not on the definition of a
foreign country. Courts have focused on where the negligent act or omission occurred, not whether the injury took place on foreign soil. 117 Typically, the plaintiff will concede that the injury occurred in a foreign
country; what remains in dispute, however, is the characterization of the
negligent "act or omission/' and the determination of where such negligence took place.
In In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,l1 8 a federal district court
held that the foreign country exception did not bar claims against the
United States for deaths resulting from an airplane crash in France. According to the court, all of the alleged negligent conduct, whether acts or
omissions, took place in California. Thus, the plaintiffs' claims arose in
110. Although Congress has retained its immunity from claims arising in foreign countries, it has created administrative remedies which arguably take some sting out of
the foreign country exception. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2737 (1982) (providing
for settlement of claims for property loss, personal injury or death)
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982), which provides in pertinent part that "[t]he provisions of this chapter and § 1346(b) of [the FTCA] shall not apply to [a]ny claim
arising in a foreign country." (emphasis supplied).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), which provides that "[t]he district courts ... shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States ... in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
113. 369 U.S. I (1962).
114. /d. at 9-10.
115. See Manemann v. United States, 381 F.2d 704, 705-06 (lOth Cir. 1967) (medical
malpractice committed in Taiwan, but resulting in an injury in the United States,
barred).
116. See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 761-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (claim against
United States arising from message sent by United States liaison with Interpol, resulting in wrongful detention of plaintiff by German officials, not barred).
117. See id. at 761-62; see also Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
118. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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California, where the government's alleged negligence occurred, rather
than in France, where the injury took place. 119
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Leaf v. United States 120 held that,
although the loss occurred in Mexico, the claim did not arise in a foreign
country because the negligent acts occurred in California and Arizona. 121
In Leaf, a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant, acting with the
consent of DEA agents, leased a plane from the plaintiffs in California.
The informant and a suspected drug smuggler took the plane to Arizona
and then to Mexico. The plane was damaged in an aborted takeoff
caused by the excess weight of an illegal marijuana cargo. The plane was
then sunk in a reservoir in Mexico to prevent the police from finding it.
The plaintiff alleged that negiigent acts by the government in California
and Arizona relating to the planning and execution of the DEA operation, and its failure to disclose the true purpose of the plane lease, proximately caused the damage to their plane. The Ninth Circuit held that
the claim arose in California, where the plane was leased, and in Arizona,
where the plane flew before going to Mexico, rather than in Mexico,
where the loss occurred. 122
Finally, in Glickman v. United States, 123 a federal district court" held
that the foreign country exception did not bar a suit filed by an American
who alleged that, while he was in Paris in 1952, Central Intelligence
Agency agents secretly gave him LSD in an experiment. In support of its
holding, the court reasoned that, although certain activities implementing the program to administer the drugs were carried out in France, the
program originated, was designed, and was set in operation in the United
States. 124 Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim arose in
the United States, where the negligent acts proximately causing the
plaintiff's injuries occurred. 125
In re Paris Air Crash, Leaf, and Glickman stand for the proposition
that courts will not exempt the United States from liability for acts or
omissions occurring in the United States even though their operative effects occur in other countries. These claims are commonly referred to as
"headquarters claims." 126 These cases support the central FTCA goal of
waiving governmental immunity in the interest of fair play and justice.
Moreover, the cases do not conflict with the Act's underlying policy of
avoiding the risk of exposing the United States to unreasonable liability
under foreign law. As one court noted, such a policy consideration "has
little bearing on a case where the acts or omissions complained of occurred in [the United States] because in such cases liability will be deter119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

!d. at 737.
588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978).
!d. at 735.
!d.
626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 174.
!d.
See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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mined under [United States] law." 127 Where the nexus or connection
between the injury and the negligence is too remote, however, courts
have denied headquarters claims. 128
In Cominotto v. United States, 129 the Ninth Circuit dismissed a
claim because the plaintiff had failed to establish a proximate connection
between the alleged negligence in the United States and the resulting
damage in Thailand. The plaintiff, a DEA informant, was solicited by
the Secret Service to assist in an undercover counterfeiting operation.
The plaintiff first met Secret Service agents in California, and then again
in Honolulu, Manila, and Malaysia. The plaintiff was shot in the leg by
suspected counterfeiters during an undercover operation in Thailand.
The plaintiff's headquarters claim alleged that the United States government had been negligent in planning the Thailand investigation. 130
The court acknowledged that headquarters claims are available to
FTCA plaintiffs when negligent acts in the United States proximately
cause harm in a foreign country. 131 Here, however, the plaintiff had
failed to establish proximate cause, because the facts indicated that the
plaintiff's violation of Secret Service instructions, and his subsequent attempt to escape from the dangerous situation in which he had placed
himself, was the sole and proximate cause of his injuries. 132 Thus, the
court concluded that the plaintiff "broke any chain of causation which
might have existed between Secret Service activities in the United States
and [the plaintiff's actions and resulting injury] in Thailand." 133
Similarly, in Eaglin v. United States, 134 the Fifth Circuit held that
the plaintiff's headquarters claim was barred because the plaintiff had
failed to show a causal nexus between the alleged negligence in the
United States and the injury in West Germany. In Eaglin, the plaintiff
was a civilian dependent from Louisiana living on a United States Army
base in West Germany. While on her way to a required exercise, she
slipped and fell on a patch of "black ice" on the base. Eaglin sued the
government for negligently failing to inform her while she was in the
United States about the weather hazards she would encounter in West
Germany, and for negligently failing to instruct her in how to discover or
avoid those hazards. 135
In dismissing the claim, the Fifth Circuit held that the connection
between the plaintiff's injury in West Germany a:p.d any act or omission
by military personnel in the United States was too tenuous and re127. Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
128. See Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1986); Eaglin v.
United States, 794 F.2d 981, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1986).
129. 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986).
130. /d. at 1129.
131. /d. at 1130 (citing Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1978)).
132. /d.
133. /d.
134. 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986).
135. /d. at 982.
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mote. 13 6 The court found that there was no negligent act performed in
the United States that directly caused the plaintiff's injury in West
Germany. 137
While the issue of proximate cause may prove to be a stumbling
block in raising a headquarters claim, recent lower court decisions indicate that courts are willing to separate negligent acts or omissions occurring in the United States from those occurring in foreign countries and to
provide compensation for injuries resulting from the former. 138 In Vogelaar v. United States, 139 for example, a federal district court held that
when a plaintiff alleges several negligent acts or omissions, those occurring in the United States are actionable even if those occurring in a foreign country are barred by the foreign country exception. 140
In Vogelaar, the mother of a serviceman killed in Vietnam sued the
government for its failure to properly investigate the circumstances of
her son's disappearance, to properly care for his remains, and to timely
identify and deliver her son's remains. The serviceman had been listed as
a deserter until his remains were discovered, approximately two years
after his death, on the site of the base where he had been stationed. The
court looked separately at the three omissions alleged by the plaintiffs
and found that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the first
two because they occurred in Vietnam. 141 The court, !10wever, found
that the third omission-that of failing to timely identify and deliver her
son's remains--occurred at a military center in Indiana. The court,
therefore, allowed the plaintiff's claim for the negligent omission which
occurred in Indiana.t42
The federal district court for the Eastern District of New York
reached a similar conclusion in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation. 143 In that case, Vietnam veterans and members of their families brought a products liability class action suit to recover damages for
injuries allegedly sustained as a result of veterans' exposure to Agent Or136. /d. at 984. The court stated that "were we to adopt a 'headquarters' exception to
section 2680(k) for the foreign nation results of negligent training or supervision
conducted in the United States ... the nexus between [the claim of negligence] in
the United States is simply too tenuous and remote." /d. The court also relied on
the Supreme Court's recent limitation on the ability of plaintiffs to avoid jurisdictional issues under the FfCA by splitting a cause of action. See United States v.
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
137. Eaglin, 794 F.2d at 984. ("If black ice is peculiar to, or common in, West Germany,
then the obvious place to warn the servicemen and their dependents of this danger is
in West Germany, not in Louisiana.").
138. See infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text. But see Grunch v. United States,
538 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (where act of negligence which allegedly
took place in the United States, flowed directly from acts occurring in West Germany, entire claim is barred by foreign country exception).
139. 665 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
140. /d. at 1302.
141. /d. at 1300.
142. /d. at 1307.
143. 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
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ange in Vietnam. The chemical companies impleaded the United States.
The court determined that, although there were many negligent acts in
both the United States and Vietnam which contributed to the veterans'
injuries, there was no policy reason to bar the claims under the foreign
claim exception. 144 After applying a headquarters claim analysis, the
court found it "undisputed that the initial decision to use Agent Orange,
the decision to continue using it, and decisions relating to the specifications for Agent Orange were made in [the United States.]" 145 The court
noted also that, while it was unclear whether alleged government misuse
of Agent Orange took place in the United States or Vietnam, there was
no reason to attribute such acts or omissions to Vietnam rather than to
the United States.I46
The Agent Orange analysis was adopted by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Beattie v. United States. 147 In Beattie,
a plane crashed into Mount Erebus, Antarctica, killing all persons on
board. In an action for wrongful death under the FTCA, the plaintiffs
alleged negligence by United States air traffic controllers at McMurdo
Naval Air Station, Antarctica. Plaintiffs also alleged negligence by Department of Defense officials in the selection, training, and supervision of
Navy personnel at McMurdo Base. 148
As in Agent Orange, the court was presented with an undetermined
mix of acts and omissions, some occurring within the United States and
others in Antarctica. 149 In holding that the foreign country exception
did not bar the plaintiffs' claims, the court accepted the proposition that
Section 2680(k) "is not a bar to jurisdiction over cases arising at least in
part outside the United States, and in areas where there is no theoretical
justification for application of foreign law." 150 In its decision, the court
separated the claims arising from negligence at McMurdo Base (Antarctica claims) and the claims arising from negligence in the United States
(headquarters claims). 151 The court then determined that the headquar144. /d. at 1255. The court did find, however, that the servicemens' and derivative family members' claims were barred by the Feres doctrine, id. at 1247, and could be
barred by the discretionary function exception. /d. at 1255-56. The court did allow
the independent claims of the servicemens' wives and children to go forward. /d. at
1254.
145. Id. at 1255.
146. /d.
147. 756 F.2d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
148. /d. at 93.
149. /d. at 96. The court held that the headquarters claims consisted of the allegations of
negligent selection, training, and supervision of the McMurdo Air Traffic Controllers by officials in Washington, D.C. Since these claims alleged negligent acts or
omissions by government employees which occurred within the United States, and
which merely had their operative effect in Antarctica, the claims did not arise in a
foreign country. /d.
150. /d. (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1254)
(E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984)).
151. /d. The court also allowed the Antarctica claims to proceed, holding that Antarctica was not a foreign country under the FTCA. /d. at 94.
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ters claims-based on allegations of negligent selection, training, and supervision of McMurdo Air Traffic Controllers by officials in Washington,
D.C.-were not barred by the foreign country exception because they did
not "arise in" a foreign country. 152

D.

Conclusion

The broad definitions of "foreign country" and "arising in" often
used by courts to dismiss FTCA claims should be more narrowly construed to achieve the central FTCA policy of fairness and justice. Specifically, American embassies and military bases abroad should not be
considered foreign countries under the FTCA. While it is true that these
facilities are on foreign soil; they are nonetheless enclaves of American
sovereignty. As such, members of these communities should be granted
the same waiver of governmental immunity enjoyed by Americans living
in the United States.
The recent expansion of headquarters claims, for acts or omissions
which take place, in whole or in part, in the United States, is a step in the
right direction. Fears that such an expansion would lead to a flood of
FTCA claims sidestepping the foreign country exception 153 have not
been realized. 154 Allowing claims to go forward if any governmental
negligence took place in the United States strikes the proper balance between the policies behind both the FTCA and the foreign country
exception.
Rather than focusing on a broad definition of "foreign country,"
courts should look at claims to see if they arise, in whole or in part, in the
United States. Upon an affirmative showing, plaintiffs should be permitted to seek redress for their injuries. The fortuitous circumstance of location should not bar suits where United States law could be applied and
the United States would not be subject to the laws of a foreign power.
IV.

CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE FERES DOCTRINE

Although members of the armed forces stationed abroad may find
their FTCA claims barred by the foreign country exception, service
members stationed in the United States may find their claims barred by
the judicially-created exception enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Feres v. United States. 155 The Feres doctrine bars all service member
claims for injuries "incident to service." 156 Prior to the Court's enuncia152. /d. at 96. The court reasoned that "[s]ince these claims allege negligent acts or
omissions by government employees which occur within the United States, and
which merely had their operative effect in Antarctica, they are not claims which
'arise in' a foreign country." /d.
153. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
154. See Bederman, Foreign Country Exception in Antarctica, supra note 65, at 737.
155. 340 u.s. 135 (1950).
156. /d. at 146. While the Supreme Court chose to create a much broader service mem-
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tion of the Feres doctrine, lower courts barred service member claims
only if they fell within a narrow construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), 157
the "combatant activities" exception to the FTCA. 158
Although the Feres doctrine has been severely criticized by courts
and commentators, 159 the Supreme Court has appeared unwilling to limit
its application or to overrule it entirely. Recent alignments within the
Court, however, and the appointment of Justices who have shown an
inclination to restrict Feres, provide hope that the FTCA soon will be a
true waiver of immunity for service members. 160

157.
158.

159.

·

160.

ber exception than that enacted by Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982), the Court
failed to clearly define the phrase "incident to service," or provide a clear, explicit
set of standards or guidelines for lower courts to follow in applying the Feres
doctrine.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982). This exception reserves governmental immunity for
"[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces,
or the Coast Guard, during time of war."
See, e.g., Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir.
1948) (FTCA should not be narrowed by judicial construction to exclude claims);
Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. La. 1947) (combat activities
exception contemplates actual warfare or conflict, nor mere practice or training
away from the zone of combat during time of war); Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F.
Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Wis. 1947) (FTCA claims not expressly excluded from the
operation of the Act must be held to have been intended to be included).
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J.) ("Feres was wrongly decided and
heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it has received.") (citations omitted) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1242,
1246 (E.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984); Hinkie v. United
States, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983) ("We are forced once again to decide a case
where 'we sense the injustice ... of [the] result'") (citation omitted) (quoting Peluso
v. United States, 474 F.2d 605,606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973)), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984); Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir.
1982) (applying Fe res "reluctantly" and "regret[ting] the effects" of the conclusion);
Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The Feres doctrine
clearly lives, although its theoretical bases remain subject to serious doubt."); Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Feres "reluctantly"); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.) ("If the matter were
open to us we would be responsive to the appellants' argument that Feres should be
reconsidered"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (E.D.N.Y.) ("Perhaps a pathbreaking appellate
court might discern enough emanations of Supreme Court disquiet to predict that
Court's future conduct in limiting Feres"), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.
1984); see also Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed
Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992, 992-99 (1986) [hereinafter
Schwartz, A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine]; Bennett, The Feres Doctrine,
Discipline and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 383, 385 (1984); Rhodes,
The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24, 40-43 (1976);
Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS L. REV.
316 (1954); Note, Servicemembers' Rights Under the Feres Doctrine: Rethinking
"Incident to Service" Analysis, 33 VILL. L. REV. 175, 176 n.7 (1988) [hereinafter
Note, Rethinking "Incident to Service" Analysis]; Note, From Feres to Stencel:
Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1099,
1099-1100 ( 1979).
A full discussion of the claims of service members' families is beyond the scope of
this Article. See generally Comment, The Feres Doctrine: Has It Created Remedi-
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Pre-Feres "Incident to Service" Approach: Military Status Alone
Does Not Bar FTCA Recovery

Shortly after the FTCA was enacted, the Supreme Court considered
whether military service members could recover under the Act for nonwartime injuries. In Brooks v. United States, 161 two servicemen and their
father were struck by a United States Army truck while driving on a
North Carolina highway. One of the servicemen was killed; the other
two men were seriously injured. The two survivors, and the estate of the
deceased, brought suit against the United States under the FTCA. 162
The Supreme Court deemed the suits proper after concluding that there
was no applicable exception barring suits for injury or death by members
of the armed forces not incident to military service. 16 3
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that, if Congress had intended "any claim" to mean "any claim but that of servicemen," it
less Wrongs for Relatives of Servicemen?, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 929 (1983); Note,
Pushing the Feres Doctrine a Generation Too Far: Recovery for Genetic Damage to
the Children of Servicemembers, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 1039 (1983); Note, If You Can't
Save Us, Save Our Families: The Feres Doctrine and Servicemen's Kin, 1983 U. ILL.
L. REV. 317.
Briefly, the claims of family members of a service member have been barred
when those claims are for injuries suffered by that service member "incident to [military] service." See, e.g., DeFont v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.)
(wife cannot sue the United States for wrongful death of serviceman-husband, even
though her claim is independent of husband's estate, because husband would be
barred under Peres from suing if he had survived), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972).
Family member claims have been permitted, however, when they are for independent injuries, even when a service member-family member is also injured in the same
accident, and whose claim is therefore barred by Peres. See, e.g., Orken v. United
States, 239 F.2d 850, 850 (6th Cir. 1956) (estate of wife and children of serviceman,
· all killed when Air Force plane crashed into their home on military base, could
bring suit against the United States for wrongful death, notwithstanding that suit
for wrongful death of serviceman-husband was barred by Peres).
Courts recently have addressed the more difficult question of whether Peres
bars the independent claims of service members' wives and children for their own
direct injuries resulting from service members' exposure to radiation during and
after World War II, or exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam. See,
e.g., Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (barring claims of serviceman's family members for injuries allegedly caused by serviceman's exposure to
radiation during active duty), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); Mondelli v. United
States, 711 F.2d 567, 569-70 (3d Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021
(1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1247-54
(E.D.N.Y.) (allowing independent claims for children's genetic injuries and birth
defects and wives' miscarriages caused by service members' exposure to Agent Orange to go forward), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
161. 337 u.s. 49 (1949).
162. The district court entered judgment against the government in favor of all three
plaintiffs. The government did not contest the father's judgment. /d. at 50. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the two brothers were in the
armed forces at the time of the crash, and were therefore barred from recovery.
United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 49
(1949).
163. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51.
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would have made that intent clear by a separate exception. 164 Although
Congress listed twelve exceptions to the Act, none explicitly excluded
service member claims for injuries not arising out of wartime activities.165 Finally, the Court found support for its decision in the Act's legislative history, which implied that Congress had considered, and
rejected, a specific exception barring all suits by members of the armed
forces. 166
According to the Brooks Court, military status alone does not bar
FTCA recovery; only suits arising from actions "incident to service" may
be barred. 167 Unfortunately, the Court was not clear in defining the term
"incident to service." Moreover, the Court undermined its own interpretation of Congress' intent. In dictum, the Court noted that interpretation
of "incident to service" may vary with the consequences, because "those
consequences may provide insight for determination of congressional
purpose." 168 The Court speculated that the "dire consequences" envisioned by the govemment 169 if service members' suits were allowed may
reflect congressional intent to bar such claims, despite the Act's "literal
language and other considerations to the contrary." 170 Because the
Court concluded that Brooks did not involve service members injured
"incident to service," it left the interpretational problems of this phrase
for another day.

B.

The Peres Doctrine: "Incident to Service" Expanded

That day came with the Supreme Court's decision in Feres v. United
States. 171 In Feres, the Court consolidated three cases for review, all of
which raised similar issues. 172 The lead case arose out of the fiery death
164. /d. The Court observed that "[i]t would be absurd to believe that Congress did not
have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed. The overseas
and combatant activities exceptions make this plain." /d.
165. /d. In particular, the Court noted the foreign country and combatant activities
exception.
166. /d. at 51-52. The Court noted that, of the 18 versions of the bills introduced in
Congress between 1925 and 1935, 16 had exceptions denying recovery to service
members. Yet, in all bills introduced after 1935, including the current version, "the
exception concerning servicemen had been dropped." /d. at 52.
167. /d. "[W]e are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the Brooks'
army careers, injuries not caused by their service except in the sense that all human
events depend upon what has already transpired. Were the accident incident to the
Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be presented." /d. (emphasis added).
168. /d.
169. "A battle commander's poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand, a defective
jeep which causes injury, all would ground tort actions against the United States."
/d.
170. /d. at 53.
171. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
172. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), a.ff'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950);
Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), a.ff'd sub nom. Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); United States v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (lOth Cir.
1949), rev'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
In Feres, a serviceman was killed in a fire in his barracks while on active duty.
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of a serviceman, allegedly as a consequence of the government's decision
to quarter him in barracks which were known to be a fire hazard. 173 The
other two cases arose out of allegedly negligent medical treatment provided to active duty personnel. 174 The plaintiffs in each case sought recovery under the FTCA.
The Feres Court read into the FTCA a new, unstated exception to
the waiver of sovereign immunity contrary to the explicit terms of the
FTCA. The Court held that the government "is not liable under the
[FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in
the course of activity incident to service." 175 Because each of the individuals on behalf of whom suit was brought sustained injuries "while on
active duty and not on furlough," 176 the claims were deemed incident to
military service and thus barred.
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected three arguments in favor
of allowing recovery by service members for injuries sustained while in
the armed forces but not in the line of active duty: first, that the Act
provides for suits alleging negligence of military personnel, because it
defines "employee of the government" to include "members of the military or naval forces of the United States"; 177 second, that under maxims
of statutory interpretation, the existence of express exceptions, particularly the combatant exception, 178 means that no additional exceptions
should be implied; 179 and finally, that the legislative history of the Act, as

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

His estate sued the government for negligence in housing him in barracks known or
which should have been known to be unsafe because of a defective heating plant,
and in failing to maintain an adequate fire watch. The district court dismissed the
case and the Second Circuit affirmed. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37.
In Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), a serviceman sued the government for
medical malpractice. The serviceman, while in the Army, underwent an abdominal
operation, during which a towel, two and one-half feet long by one and one-half feet
wide, marked "Medical Department U.S. Army," was found in his stomach. The
district court dismissed the claim after concluding as a matter of law that the FTCA
did not cover service-connected disabilities occurring while the plaintiff was enlisted. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 711. The Fourth Circuit affirmed after concluding
that Congress had not intended that courts question the "propriety of military decisions and actions" by allowing the claims of service members under the FTCA.
Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 520.
In the third case, United States v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (lOth Cir. 1949), rev'd sub
nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Tenth Circuit held that the
estate of an Army officer could recover under the FTCA for wrongful death caused
by the negligence of members of the Army Medical Corps. Griggs, 178 F.2d at 3.
Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
/d.
/d. at 146.
/d. at 138.
/d. Therefore, suits of negligence by military personnel against other military personnel were within the contemplation of the Act.
28 u.s.c. § 2680(j) (1982).
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1949). The existence of a wartime combatant activities exception could be said to imply allowance of claims by service
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discussed in Brooks, 180 and the Brooks opinion itself, support allowing
suits by service members against the government where the injuries do
not arise from actual combat. 181 The Court rejected all three arguments
and offered three rationales in support of its decision. 182
First, the Court noted the lack of a parallel private liability for torts
committed by military personnel of the armed forces. 183 The FTCA provides that the United States will be liable "in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 184 The
Court could find no private liability "even remotely analogous" to the
liability asserted by service members against the government. 185 Moreover, the Court noted that, because "no private individual has power to
conscript or mobilize a private army," there can be no parallel liability
"under like circumstances." 186 In the absence of such parallel private
liability, and in the absence of any American law "permitt[ing] a soldier
to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the government he is serving," the Court declined to find analogous liability. 187
The second rationale the Feres Court relied on was the "distinctively
federal" relationship between the government and service members. 188
The FTCA provides that "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred" governs any consequent liability. 189 According to the Court,
Congress could not have intended the Act to apply to service-connected
injuries because such an interpretation would subject a service member to
the "law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 190 Since service members are not free to choose where they live, they have no power
to decide the jurisdiction in which they could bring suit. 191

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

188.
189.
190.
191.

members arising from non-combat activities during peacetime. See supra note 158
and accompanying text.
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1949).
/d. at 51-52.
Peres, 340 U.S. at 141-44.
/d. at 141-43.
/d. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1946)).
/d.
/d. at 141-42.
/d. at 141. Specifically, the Court refused to "visit the Government with novel and
unprecedented liabilities." Id. at 142. But see Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 315, 319 (1957) (stating that "the very purpose of the [FfCA] was to ...
establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability"). The Supreme Court
soon realized that it had overstepped the bounds of judicial construction, and in
later cases rejected the parallel private liability rationale as it applies to "uniquely
governmental" functions. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988)
(putting to rest the argument that the FfCA precludes liability for uniquely governmental functions); see also Note, United States v. Johnson· Expansion of the Feres
Doctrine to Include Servicemembers' FTCA Suits Against Civilian Government Employees, 42 VAND. L. REV. 233, 240-41 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Expansion of the
Feres Doctrine].
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142-44 (1950).
/d. at 142 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946)).
28 u.s.c. § l346(b) (1946).
Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43. It is difficult to understand, however, how barring all
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As its third rationale for holding the FTCA inapplicable to claims
by service members, the Court relied on the existence of other compensation schemes for injured military veterans. 192 In enacting the FfCA,
Congress made no substitution of remedies. The Court found the absence of such a provision persuasive that "there was no awareness that
the [FTCA] might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident
to military service." 193 The possibility of adequate compensation under
existing military systems, similar to workers' compensation statutes, convinced the Court that allowing FfCA recovery for service members was
not necessary. 194
The Peres Court did not overrule its previous holding in Brooks v.
United States; 195 instead it distinguished the two cases on their facts.
The injury to the servicemen in Brooks occurred when they were on leave
and not on active military duty. The Brooks Court held that the sole fact
that the brothers were in the Army did not bar their claims, because the
claims did not "arise out of or in the course of military duty." The Feres

192.
193.
194.

195.

claims by service members is any more rational than allowing a claim to proceed
under the law where the negligence occurred, as with any other FfCA claim.
The distinctively federal argument, though not rejected outright by the Court
in later decisions, was later described as "no longer controlling," United States v.
Johnson, 481 U.S. 691, 695 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985)), and wholly abandoned in suits brought by
federal prisoners. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
In Muniz, federal prisoners sued the government for injuries caused by the negligence of prison employees. The Court held that the FfCA did not bar the suits,
and reasoned that while prisoners have no control over their geographical location
and the governing local tort laws, to not allow any suits would be more prejudicial
than a nonuniform right to recover. /d. at 162; accord United States v. Johnson, 481
U.S. 691, 695-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (A "nonuniform recovery cannot possibly be
worse than (what Feres provides) uniform nonrecovery"). But see infra notes 206214, 222 and accompanying text.
Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45.
/d. at 144.
/d. at 145. For example, the Court noted that the widow in Griggs would receive
$22,000.00 from the government under a military compensation system, whereas
she could only receive a maximum of $15,000.00 under Illinois' wrongful death law.
/d.
The substitute compensation rationale, like the others relied on by the Feres
Court, has been frequently criticized. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681,
697-99 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949). In Brooks, the Court rejected the argument that the existence of other service member benefits barred FfCA recovery. /d. at 53-54. Although the Brooks
Court indicated that alternate compensation could reduce FfCA recovery, it declined to rule on the exclusivity or election of remedies. /d. at 53. The Court noted
that, unlike workers' compensation statutes, neither the FfCA nor veterans' laws
provide for exclusiveness of remedy. The Court could find no reason to forbid
FfCA claims for service members, veterans or their dependents in the Act or its
legislative history. /d. But see infra notes 206-214, 222 and accompanying text.
Subsequent to its decision in Feres, the Court in United States v. Brown, 348
U.S. 110 (1954) reiterated that the existence of alternate compensation did not bar a
service member's claim under the FfCA. /d. at 113. For a further discussion of the
Brown decision, see infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
337 u.s. 49 (1949).

506

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 18

Court found this to be the "vital distinction." 196 The servicemen in
Brooks were able to recover because their relationship to the Army while
on leave was not "analogous to that of a soldier injured while performing
duties under orders."I97
C

The Military Discipline Rationale

The most common justification offered in support of the Feres doctrine, the military discipline rationale-is found not in Feres itself, but in
a later Supreme Court decision, United States v. Brown. 198 In Brown, a
veteran alleged permanent injury to the nerves in his leg after a knee
operation in a Veterans' Administration hospital after his discharge from
the Army. The knee had been injured while the veteran was on active
duty. 199 The Court concluded that Brown was governed by Brooks, and
not by Feres, because the injury occurred after the veteran's discharge. 200
In distinguishing Brown from Feres, the Court stated that Feres is best
explained by the "peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and
the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the [FTCA] were
allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the
course of military duty .... "20 1
In allowing the veteran in Brown to maintain his FTCA suit, the
Court did not back away from the Feres doctrine. Indeed, in dictum, the
Court specifically endorsed the Feres distinction between injuries that do,
and injuries that do not, arise out of or in the course of military duty. 202
The Court, however, distinguished the situation in Brown from that in
Feres by characterizing the negligent act giving rise to the veteran's injury as not "incident to the military service. " 203 Thus, according to the
court, the original knee injury suffered by the plaintiff would be barred
196.
197.
198.
199.

200.
201.

202.
203.

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
/d.
348 u.s. 110 (1954).
/d. at 110-11. The veteran had received compensation under the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1935), for both the original injury and
injuries stemming from the allegedly negligent operation after his discharge. The
district court dismissed the veteran's FTCA claim after concluding that his sole
relief was under the Veterans' Act. The Second Circuit reversed. Brown, 209 F.2d
463 (2d Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of
whether Brooks or Feres was controlling. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111
(1954).
Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
/d. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-43 (1950)). This rationale was
never set forth explicitly by the Court in Feres. It was, however, explicitly adopted
by Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), where the Fourth Circuit found it unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended that civil courts evaluate the propriety of military decisions and actions, and thereby impair military discipline by
subjecting military command to public criticism. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 520.
Brown, 348 U.S. at 113.
!d.
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under Feres while the subsequent medical malpractice injury on the same
knee would be allowed under Brooks. 204

D.

The Supreme Court's Expansion of Peres: A Shift in Focus to the
Military Discipline Rationale

For almost thirty years after Brown, the Court did not rule on a
FTCA military service claim, although it did address Feres on several
occasions in dicta. 205 In 1977, the Court explicitly reaffirmed the underlying Feres doctrine in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 206
a case involving a cross-claim in an indemnity action against the United
States for injuries suffered by a National Guard officer after the ejection
system in his fighter aircraft malfunctioned. The serviceman sued both
the United States and the manufacturer of the ejection system. The manufacturer cross-claimed against the United States, alleging that any malfunction in the system was due to faulty government specifications and
components. 207
The Supreme Court held that the right of a third party to recover in
an indemnity action against the United States, as recognized in United
States v. Yellow Cab, 208 must be limited by the rationales of the Feres
doctrine where the injured party is a service member. 209 In reaching its
204. /d. Justice Black, in dissent, called for the application of a "but for" test. According to Justice Black; the injury in the present case was inseparably related to military service because the veteran could not have been injured in the Veterans'
Administration hospital "but for" his Army service and related injury. Thus, Feres,
and not Brooks, should be controlling. In particular, Justice Black thought that
veterans and soldiers should receive the same disability benefits for a hospital injury.
Therefore, he concluded, "We have previously held, I think correctly, that a soldier
injured in a hospital cannot also sue for damages under the [FfCA]. But the Court
now holds that a veteran can." /d. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Peres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).
205. See Matinez v. Shrock, 430 U.S. 920, 920-21 (1977) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1966); Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1962).
206. 431 u.s. 666 (1977).
207. !d. at 668. The district court had dismissed the claim, holding that Feres barred the
claim of the serviceman and that of the manufacturer. Donham v. United States,
395 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1975). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Donham v. United
States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the Feres doctrine and the indemnity principles of United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 670.
In Yellow Cab, the Court held that the FTCA permits third-party impleader
against the government, under a theory of indemnity or contribution, if the original
defendant claims that the United States was wholly or partially responsible for the
plaintiff's injury. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 553. Thus, in Stencel, the Court was
faced with a conflict between well-established indemnity principles under the FfCA
and the equally well-established Feres doctrine. The specific issue addressed by the
Stencel Court was whether a private defendant could seek indemnification from the
United States under the FTCA when a service member has brought a tort action
against that defendant. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666,
670 (1977).
208. 340 U.S. 543 (1951); see also supra note 207.
209. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 6.73-74.
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decision, the Court applied two of the rationales it enunciated in Feres
and the military discipline rationale first enunciated in Brown. 210 First,
the Court noted that the distinctively federal relationship between the
government and members of the armed forces applies equally to the relationship between the government and its military suppliers and contractors. 211 Second, while the Court acknowledged that the military
compensation scheme, which prevents service members from recovery
under the FTCA, provides no relief to a third party, the Court nonetheless held that where the Veterans' Benefits Act 212 provides an upper limit
of liability for service-connected injuries, the FTCA cannot be used to
circumvent that limitation by indemnity claims. 213 Finally, the Court
concluded that "where the case concerns an injury sustained by a soldier
while on duty, the effect of the action upon military discipline is identical
whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by a third party." 214
With the Court's decision in Stencel, the military discipline rationale
became a dominant theme in cases decided by the Burger Court. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Chappell v. Wallace, 215 further
expanded the scope of the Fe res doctrine by holding that enlisted military
personnel may not recover damages from a superior officer for alleged
constitutional violations because of the need for special regulations in
relation to military discipline. 216 The Court's analysis focused on "the
peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors," and the
unique structure of the military establishment. 217 Noting that "no military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation
that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting," the Court cautioned
that "[c]ivilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the Court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior
officers." 218 Relying on Feres and a longstanding history of deferring to
Congress' authority over military affairs, the Court declined to extend its
prior decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the -Federal
Bureau of Narcotics 219 to claims by enlisted military personnel because of
the intrusion upon military discipline and authority such claims might
210. See supra notes 188-194, 201 and accompanying text.
21 I. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672.
212. Public L. No. 85-857, § 1, 72 Stat. 1105 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1-15228 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
213. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
214. !d.
215. 462 u.s. 296 (1983).
216. /d. at 305.
217. /d. at 300.
218. /d.
219. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court had authorized suits for damages against
federal officials whose actions violated an individual's constitutional rights, even
where Congress had not expressly authorized such suits. /d. at 397; see also supra
note 11, and infra note 245.
•
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have. 220
The military discipline rationale, which was not one of the three
rationales the Court relied on in Feres, 221 has been repeatedly and almost
mindlessly applied to bar service member claims under the FTCA, even
as the original Feres rationales have been rejected by both the Supreme
Court and lower courts. 222 The shift in focus to the military discipline
rationale has resulted in a mechanistic rejection of service members'
FTCA claims on the ground that military discipline might be impaired if
the claims were allowed to go forward. The prospect of service members
"second-guessing" military orders, and the possibility of military personnel testifying in court as to each other's decisions and actions, 223 has led
courts to dismiss claims even where there is no logical or rational connection between military discipline and the alleged injury. 224
220. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300-05. According to Chief Justice Burger:
The special status of the military has required, the Constitution has contemplated, Congress has created, and this Court has long recognized two
systems of justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one for
military personnel. The special nature of military life-the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined
responses by enlisted personnel-would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those
they are charged to command.
/d. at 303-04 (citation omitted).
221. For a discussion of the three original Fe res rationales, see supra notes 182-194 and
accompanying text.' See also Note, Rethinking "Incident to Service" Analysis, supra
note 159, at 181-82 (1988).
222. See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text. The parallel private liability rationale was rejected by the Supreme Court in both Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957) and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 6669 (1955). The distinctively federal rationale was rejected by the Court in United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 161 (1963). The third Feres rationale, the uniform
compensation rationale, had been largely ignored by both the Supreme Court and
lower courts since the Brown decision, where a serviceman was permitted to recover
under the FTCA even though veterans' benefits were available to him. United
States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1959); see also Note, Expansion of the Feres
Doctrine, supra note 187, at 242.
Although the Supreme Court seemed to have abandoned those rationales after
Feres was decided, the Court resurrected the distinctively federal rationale and the
uniform compensation rationale in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431
U.S. 666, 671 (1977). According to one commentator, many lower courts and commentators "questioned the continued viability of Feres when military discipline was
not at stake" before Stencel was decided. See Note, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine,
supra note 187, at 243. Afterward, lowe:- courts again gave weight to the original
Feres rationales and summarily denied recovery to servicemen. /d.
223. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
224. This is particularly true of military medical malpractice cases, in which military
discipline is not a compelling issue. See, e.g., Major v. United States, 835 F.2d 641,
644-45 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2871 (1988) ("In recent years the
[Supreme] Court has embarked on a course dedicated to broadening the Feres doctrine to encompass, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that
are even remotely related to the individual's status as a member of the military,
without regard to ... any nexus between the injury-producing event and the essential defense/combat purpose of the military activity from which it arose.") (empha-
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Recent Expansion of the Peres Doctrine: A Return to "Incident to
Service" Analysis

The Feres doctrine, in its broadest form, would appear to preclude
all tort claims by service members against the federal government. In its
most narrow form, the rule would seem to preclude only those claims by
active duty service members which genuinely implicate military discipline. Since 1950, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
struggled, without much success, to more precisely define the limits of
the doctrine.
In United States v. Shearer, 225 the Court considered a wrongful
death claim brought by the mother of an army private who was murdered by a fellow service member while off-base and off duty. The Third
Circuit ruled that Fe res did not bar recovery because the decedent, unlike
the claimants in Feres, was on leave at the time of his death. 226 In reversing the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the Feres doctrine "cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules," and that each case
must be decided individually. 227 Despite the fact that the decedent was
off-duty and off-base at the time of his murder, the Court held that the
claim was barred because the suit required a "civilian court to secondguess military decisions, " 228 and called "into question basic choices

225.
226.
227.
228.

sis in original). For additional examples, see Schwartz, A Proposed Reform of the
Feres Doctrine, supra note 159, at 1003-10.
473 u.s. 52 (1985).
Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983). The District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania had dismissed the claim under the Feres doctrine.
Shearer, 576 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
473 u.s. 52, 57 (1985).
/d. The Court reasoned that the possibility of impaired military discipline and effectiveness outweighed the fact that the murder had taken place while the soldier was
off-duty and off-base. /d.
In the confusion following Brooks, Feres, and Brown, lower courts unnecessarily expanded the Feres doctrine by relying on overly-restrictive tests such as offbase/on-base or off-duty/on-duty distinctions. Compare Preferred Ins. Co. v.
United States, 222 F.2d 942, 948 (9th Cir.) (recovery denied for injuries sustained
when plane fell on serviceman's home located on-base), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 837
(1955) with Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496, 498 (W.D. La. 1957) (recovery
permitted for injuries sustained when plane fell on serviceman's off-base home); see
also Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1140 (4th Cir. 1975) (recovery denied to
off-duty serviceman injured while riding a horse rented from Marine Corps stable);
Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 1966) (recovery denied
where serviceman drowned while swimming recreationally in base pool).
In Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1980), the Eighth Circuit
surveyed other Circuit decisions and found that courts barred service members'
claims if, at the time of injury, the service member was on a military base, on active
duty status, under compulsion of military orders or engaged in an activity that is a
privilege related to or dependent upon military status. /d. at 483. Under such a
restrictive analysis, the presence of any one of the four factors barred recovery. The
only factual scenarios permitting recovery would be for an injury off-duty and offbase, the situation in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), but rejected in
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about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman." 229
Shearer contains conflicting messages for those anxious to see a relaxation of the Feres doctrine. The optimists among us take comfort in
the Court's statement that there are no hard and fast rules to ascertain
the reach of Feres and that a case-by-case analysis is necessary. This
language leaves room for the argument that Feres should be applied only
where issues of military command are implicated. 23° For the pessimists,
however, Shearer represents an expansion of the Feres doctrine, precluding not only claims like those brought in Feres (claims for injuries sustained by active duty personnel), but also precluding claims for injuries
sustained by service members on leave or after discharge, a class of
claims not addressed by Feres, and specifically allowed in Brooks and
Brown. 231
In 1987, the Supreme Court confronted the Feres doctrine on two
occasions. 232 Significantly, both cases were decided by a five-four majority. In the first case, United States v. Johnson, 233 the widow of a Coast
Guard helicopter pilot alleged negligence on the part of civilian employees of the Federal Aviation Administration in providing radar control to
the pilot during a rescue mission. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Feres

229.

230.

231.

232.
233.

Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), or for injury after discharge, the situation in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
Other courts have applied the even more restrictive "but-for" test to deny recovery: if an injury would not have occurred but-for the plaintiff's status as a service member, the claim is barred. See, e.g., Schwager v. United States, 326 F. Supp.
1081, 1086 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (government not liable under FfCA for injuries arising
out of conduct incident to military service even when illness first manifested at
home while on leave). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected a strict but-for test in
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949). But see Justice Black's dissent in
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 114 (Black, J., dissenting).
Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58. Although the complaint alleged negligence by the Army in
making a "straightforward personnel decision," the Court refused to let the soldier's
widow "escape the Feres net" by recharacterizing what the Court termed a management "decision of command." /d. at 59.
The Court acknowledged that the soldier who was convicted of Shearer's murder had previously been convicted of manslaughter while at an Army base in Germany before being transferred to Fort Bliss. Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the
claim, which alleged that the Army negligently failed to control and warn others of
a soldier it knew to be dangerous, because it feared that allowing such suits would
expose commanding officers to civilian review of military and disciplinary decisions.
/d. at 58.
See Atkinson v. United States, 804 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1986) (recovery allowed
for medical malpractice claim which did not affect military discipline and therefore
was not incident to service), withdrawn, 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987) (reinstatement
of per se denial of recovery to serviceman for military medical malpractice following
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987)).
But cf Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (off-duty serviceman hit by
military vehicle not barred by Feres doctrine from recovery under FfCA); Brown v.
United States, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (veteran allowed to recover for military medical
malpractice which took place after discharge).
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669 (1987).
481 u.s. 681 (1987).
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was inapplicable because the suit alleged negligence on the part of civilian government employees and not on the part of miliary personnel, and
thus did not implicate issues of military discipline or the like. 234
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the pilot's death arose out of an
activity directly related to his military service and, therefore, the claim
was barred by the Feres doctrine. 235 As a rationale, Justice Powell offered only that a claim arising out of "service-related activity necessarily
implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission," 236 even where the
military judgments and decisions do not form the basis for the claim.
Widening further the military discipline rationale, Justice Powell asserted that "military discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but
more generally duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's country." 237
In Johnson, the Court broadened the military discipline rationale
and shifted the focus back to the original Feres emphasis on whether a
service member's claim is "incident to service." Once again, however,
the Court did not adequately define that phrase. Moreover, the Court's
resurrection of the original Feres rationales, 238 although not explicitly
overruling the Shearer military discipline analysis, undoubtedly will lead
to confusion among lower courts. 239
Justice Scalia, joined by three other justices in dissent, railed bitterly
against the injustice of Feres and indicated that he would be willing to
overrule the doctrine outright in the proper case. 240 He further advocated a rule that would confine Feres to FTCA suits alleging military
negligence. 241
Johnson, like Shearer, contains two conflicting messages regarding
the scope and continued vitality of the Feres doctrine. On the one hand,
the opinion suggests that claims by service members will be barred even
where such claims have a tenuous impact upon the so-called "military
234. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985), a.ff'd on rehearing,
779 F.2d 1492 (lith Cir. 1986).
235. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691-92. In "declin[ing] to modify the [Feres] doctrine at this
late date," Justice Powell relied on the fact that the Court had never "deviated"
from the doctrine, and that Congress, despite the fact that it could have remedied
the Feres doctrine if the Court had misinterpreted its intent by focusing on whether
service members' injuries are "incident to service," had not "changed this standard
in the close to 40 years since it was articulated." /d. at 686-88.
236. /d. at 691.
237. /d.
238. See supra notes 182-194 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
240. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.). Justice Scalia forcefully observed that "Feres
was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it has received." /d. at 700 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984)).
241. /d.
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mission. " 242 On the other hand, the doctrine's longevity may be in question, given the length and fervor of Justice Scalia's dissent, that three
other Justices shared his position, and that now-retired Justice Powell
authored the Court's majority opinion.
In the second 1987 case, United States v. Stanley,2 43 the Supreme
Court again affirmed and expanded the Feres doctrine. Stanley involved a
FTCA claim by a former serviceman against the government for injuries
sustained as a consequence of being given a hallucinogenic drug in a government study without his knowledge or consent. 244 The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, rejected the plaintiff's claim on the
authority of Feres, because the claimant's injuries arose out of an activity
directly related to his military service. 245
Significantly, however, Justice O'Connor, who was a member of the
majority in Johnson, wrote a dissenting opinion in Stanley in which she
stated that the government's conduct was "so far beyond the bounds of
human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be considered a
part of the military mission." 246 As indicated from her dissent, Justice
O'Connor appears willing to recognize that there are some injuries sus242. See, e.g., Appelhans v. United States, 877 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1989). In Appelhans,
an Army service member on indefinite excess leave pending review of his courtmartial sentence was later formally discharged. After his discharge, he filed a medical malpractice claim against the government, alleging negligent failure to diagnose
and treat a medical condition for which he had sought treatment at an Army hospital while on excess leave. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
dismissed his claim on the ground that it was barred by Peres and its progeny. /d. at
310.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that medical treatment at a military hospital is "incident to service" and malpractice claims are thus barred by the Peres
doctrine. /d. at 313. While the court acknowledged that "the Peres doctrine is not
without critics," and may produce "undeniably harsh results," it felt bound by the
Johnson Court's revitalization of the military discipline rationale and the original
Peres rationales. /d. at 313. Thus, the court rejected Appelhans' contention that his
relationship to the Army's "military mission" while on excess leave was too remote
and tenuous to fall under the general principles of Peres and Johnson. /d. at 312-13.
243. 483 u.s. 669 (1987).
244. The drug had been given to the claimant in connection with a 1958 study performed
at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland. The sole purpose of the study was
to ascertain the effect of the drug on humans. Thus, the claimant was literally used
as a human guinea pig in the government study. He did not learn of the drug administration until 17 years later, when he received a letter soliciting his cooperation
in a study on the long-term effects of LSD. At that point, he filed his claims against
the government. /d. at 671-72.
245. The claimant filed claims against the government under the FTCA and on the Bivens theory. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) recognized a cause of action for violation of constitutional
rights against federal officials even in the absence of a statute authorizing such relief.
The FTCA claim was dismissed and never was considered by the Supreme Court on
its merits. The Court, however, held that the exception to the FTCA established by
Peres is as extensive as the abstention required by federal courts in the face of a
Bivens claim. Thus, Peres and its progeny are directly controlling in the Bivens
context. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 680-81 (1987).
246. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tained by active duty military personnel at the hands of other government employees which neither "arise out of," nor are "incident to,"
military service.
In light of these recent decisions, one can envision a coalition composed of Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor, and the three Justices who dissented in both Johnson and Stanley-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens-willing to restrict the Feres doctrine in the appropriate case.
Thus, serious consideration should be given to pressing meritorious
claims on behalf of injured service members, even where such claims, at
first blush, appear barred by the Feres doctrine.
F.

Conclusion

The FTCA was enacted in 1946, shortly after the end of the World
War II. Although Congress waived sovereign immunity for many tort
claims previously barred, it chose to retain immunity for claims arising
out of military combat activities during times of war. Given the fact that
nearly one million American military personnel were killed or wounded
during World War 11, 247 the explicit exception for injuries arising from
combat activities is understandable. The Supreme Court's expansion of
that exception under the Feres doctrine, however, is neither understandable nor appropriate.
The Supreme Court's recent expansion of the Feres doctrine in Johnson and Stanley now appears to afford the government absolute immunity from suits by service members. 248 This apparent grant of absolute
immunity contradicts the basic intent and policies underlying the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. The Court's
expansion of Section 26800) of the FTCA-the combatant exception-to
any claim brought by a service member is outside the scope of Congress'
initial intent. Indeed, criticism of the Fe res doctrine in its current form is
nearly universal.249 Lower court dissatisfaction with both Feres and its
successors will lead to an ever-conflicting array of cases. Thus, to reduce
confusion and to uphold the original intent of Congress, the Supreme
Court should severely restrict Feres, or overrule the Feres doctrine
entirely.
V.

CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE EXERCISE OF A
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION

When Congress waived federal sovereign immunity from suits for
injuries caused by the negligence of government agents, officials or employees, it explicitly reserved immunity for certain claims. One such res247. Between 1939 and 1945, 292,131 service members were killed and 671,278 military
personnel were wounded. R. GORALSKI, WORLD WAR II ALMANAC: 1931-1945
428 (1984 ed.).
248. See supra notes 232-246 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 240.
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ervation, considered by many to be the most important, 250 is the
discretionary function exception. 251 The rule that immunity is retained
for claims arising out of the performance of a discretionary function is
easily stated but difficult to apply. The Supreme Court has not set clear
standards for differentiating between immune "discretionary" acts and
acts which involve the exercise of discretion but are not immune. 252 Indeed, the Court has observed that it is virtually "impossible to define
with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception." 253
Consequently, the various circuits have taken conflicting approaches in
resolving discretionary function claims. 254 Thus, whether a government
employee's act or omission involves the exercise of discretion depends
more upon the jurisdiction in which a suit is filed than upon the facts of
the particular case.

A.

The Lack of a Definition of "Discretionary Function" under
Dalehite v. United States

In its first consideration of the discretionary function exception, the
Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United 'States 255 found it unnecessary to
define precisely the parameters of governmental activity characterized as
"discretionary." 256 Instead, the Court focused on whether the acts of the
250. See H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1942) (calling the discretionary
function exception a "highly important exception"); see also Schwartz & Mahshigian, In the 1990's the Government Must Be a Reasonable Person in Its Workplaces: The Discretionary Function Immunity Shield Must Be Trimmed, 46 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 359, 360 (1989) (calling the discretionary function exception "the
most important of the exclusions [and] also the most amorphous").
251. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). Section 2680(a) provides that sovereign immunity is
not waived for
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation·be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
/d.
252. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), where the Court first discussed the discretionary function exception, but failed to set forth a definitive test
for application of the exception.
253. United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 u.s. 797, 813 (1984).
254. Compare Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (lOth Cir. 1987) (dismissing
claims brought by residents of Utah for injuries arising out of government's failure
to monitor and provide public information on radioactive fallouts during nuclear
testing in the 1950s and 1960s, because the government's planning and implementing activities involved policy judgment), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) with
Starrett v. United States, 847 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing claim alleging
well water contamination by chemicals from an adjoining naval base because the
failure to follow legislative and presidential guidelines for "secondary treatment" of
waste waters from federal facilities is not a discretionary act).
255. 346 u.s. 15 (1953).
256. /d. at 35.
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federal officials and employees involved "policy judgment and decision,"
and whether those decisions were made at a planning or operational
level. 257
Dalehite was a test case representing over 300 separate claims totalling more than 200 million dollars. The claims arose from an explosion
and fire that destroyed Texas City, Texas. Although the cause of the fire
was unknown, the source of the explosions and fire was a highly flammable government-manufactured fertilizer. The fertilizer was produced,
distributed, and was about to be shipped, by the government as part of a
foreign aid program after World War 11. 258 After manufacturing and
packaging the fertilizer, the government shipped the fertilizer to Texas
City, where it was loaded onto French steamships heading for Europe.
Although the fertilizer contained an ingredient used for explosives and
was known by the government to be dangerous, the fertilizer was coated
in a flammable substance, placed in easily ignitable paper bags, and inadequately labeled as flammable. The fertilizer was loaded next to a cargo
of explosives; the fertilizer ignited and caused the cargo to explode. 259
Plaintiffs injured by the explosion sued the United States government for negligently manufacturing and distributing a highly flammable
material without adequate warning. 260 The Court held that the discretionary function exception barred every claim of negligent action or decision making by the government in creating or implementing the fertilizer
program. 261 In reaching its decision, the Court began by examining the
legislative history and basic jurisprudential principles behind the FTCA
and its waiver of sovereign immunity. 262
The Court acknowledged that the motivation and legislative purpose in enacting the FTCA was to allow suits against the government
previously barred by sovereign immunity for negligent acts or omissions
of government agents or employees. 263 The Court noted, however, that
while it was bound to give the Act a construction consistent with that
purpose, it was also obligated to give "due regard for the statutory exceptions to that policy." 264 According to the Court, the discretionary func257. !d. at 35-36.
258. !d. at 19. The foreign aid plan was the government's solution to the problem of
feeding the people of Germany, Japan, and Korea during post-war United States
occupation. The plan had been ordered by the Office of War Mobilization andReconversion, approved by the Cabinet, provided with funds by the War Department,
and administered by the Field Director of Ammunition Plants. /d. at 20.
259. !d. at 17-23.
260. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23. The district court accepted the plaintiffs' theory, after
finding that a number of negligent acts by the government proximately caused their
injuries. The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for the United States.
In re Texas City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari because the case "presented an important problem of federal statutory interpretation." Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 17.
261. !d. at 42.
262. /d. at 24-30.
263. /d. at 31.
264. !d.
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tion exception was enacted to protect governmental decision making and
policy judgments from "second guessing" by the courts. 265 In the
Court's view, Congress agreed to waive government immunity for such
acts as the negligent operation of a vehicle, but did not consent to suit for
governmental activities involving some measure of discretion or judgment, such as that involved in the fertilizer program. 266
Again, the Court found it "unnecessary to define ... precisely where
discretion ends. " 267 Rather, the Court found it sufficient to hold that
the "discretionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis
for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It
necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official direction
cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of
2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when
a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step, each
action or nonaction being directed by the superior exercising,
perhaps abusing, discretion. 268
In the years following the Court's broad and sweeping proclamation
that "[w]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion," lower courts were faced with the dilemma of either barring
every claim involving some element of choice by a government employee,
or manipulating the Dalehite planning/operational distinction to hold
that some claims were not barred. 269
265. /d. at 28-30. In support of its interpretation, the Court referred to an oft-quoted
paragraph of the House Report of the 77th Congress that adopted the discretionary
function exception. The paragraph provides that the discretionary function
exception
is a highly important exception, intended to preclude any possibility that
the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government growing out of an authorized activity ... where no negligence on
the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is
the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be
tortious, or that the statute or regulation authorizing the project was invalid .... The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the
validity of or provide a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even
though negligently performed and involving an abuse of discretion.
/d. at 29 n.21 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1942)).
266. /d. at 34.
267. /d. at 35.
268. /d. at 35-36 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
269. See, e.g., Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1983) (failure of
government psychiatrist to warn foreseeable victim of violent tendencies of mental
patients is operational act, not discretionary act involving planning); Nevin v.
United States, 696 F.2d 1229, 1230-31 (9th Cir.) (decision by chief chemical officer
authorizing biological warfare vulnerability test was made at planning level and,
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The "Planning/Operational" Distinction

The test enunciated by the majority in Dalehite to determine
whether a governmental act or omission falls within the discretionary
function exception focused on whether the decisions were made at a
planning or operational level. Obviously, all acts involve some elements
of choice or decision. For example, in deciding to meet its obligations
during the occupation of Europe by shipping fertilizer, the government
made decisions ranging from converting artillery plants to fertilizer
plants, to deciding whether paper is a suitable material for bagging hot
fertilizer, to how the bags should be labelled. According to the Court, all
of the allegedly negligent acts took place at the planning level, and thus
were protected by the discretionary function exception. 270
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson criticized the majority's focus on who exercised the discretion and whether an act is discretionary.271 In Justice Jackson's view, "[t]he statute itself contains not the
vaguest intimation of such a test which leaves actionable only the misconduct of file clerks and truck drivers." 272 The key issue is not whether
the person making a decision is at a "high-altitude," but whether the act
involved is an exertion of governmental authority, or balancing of "care
against cost, of safety against production, of warning· against silence. " 273
The dissent found that the government's negligence in manufacturing and shipping the fertilizer did not involve "policy decisions of a regulatory or governmental nature, but involved actions akin to those of a
private manufacturer, contractor, or shipper." 274 Justice Jackson therefore reasoned that, where government officials performed activities of a
"housekeeping" nature, there is "no good reason to stretch the legislative
text to immunize the government or its officers from responsibility for
their acts .... " 275

C

Between Dalehite and Varig

For the next thirty years, the debate between the majority and dissenting opinions in Dalehite was reflected in lower court decisions. Some
courts, struggling with the planning/operational distinction, found solace
in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Indian Towing Co. v. United

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

therefore, decision to use strain of bacterium resulting in the death of plaintiff was
discretionary function), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Doyle v. United States,
530 F.Supp. 1278, 1283-84 (C.D. Ca. 1982) (discretionary function exception insulates any high level policy judgments from FICA liability, but where decision occurs at operational level of government, exception provides no protection although
discretion and judgment may in fact have been exercised).
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 42.
/d. at 58 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
/d. n.l2.
/d. at 57-58.
/d. at 60.
/d.
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States, 216 and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States.2' 1 In Indian Towing, a tugboat ran aground when a Coast Guard operated lighthouse failed to
function, causing damage to the cargo on the barge it was towing. The
tugboat's owners sued the government for failing to check and repair the
light or give warning that the light was not operating. 278 In Rayonier, a
forest fire which started on government land and spread to adjacent private property destroyed timber and buildings belonging to the plaintiffs.
The property owners sued the government for the negligence of the
United States Forest Services in failing to properly fight the forest fire
and in allowing flammable materials to accumulate on government
land. 279
In both Indian Towing and Rayonier the government did not assert
that the discretionary function exception barred the claims; rather, the
government argued that it was not liable for negligence arising from
"uniquely governmental functions." 280'fhus, the Court was not presented
with the opportunity to reconsider the interpretation of the discretionary
function exception set out in Dalehite. Dicta in both cases, however, indicates a limitation on the Dalehite decision. In Indian Towing, the
Court, after finding Dalehite inapplicable, observed that the "broad and
just purpose which the [FTCA] was designed to effect was to compensate
the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in circumstances like . . . those in which a private person would be liable .... " 281 The Rayonier Court acknowledged the heavy burden that
may be imposed upon the public treasury if the government is held responsible for the negligence of it's employees and agencies. The Court,
however, rejected consideration of such a factor in the face of obvious
congressional intent in passing the FTCA. 282 Moreover, the Court suggested that, "[t]o the extent that there was anything to the contrary in
the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing." 283 Finally, the Court cautioned that "[t]here is no justification for this Court
to read exemptions into the [FTCA] beyond those provided by Congress.
If the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body that
adopted it." 284 Those broad policy pronouncements, however, did not
end the debate over the scope of the discretionary functions exception.
D.

Varig and the Return of Dalehite
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Indian Towing and

350 u.s. 61 (1955).
352 U.S. 315 (1957).
Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 62.
Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 315-16.
Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319; Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64.
Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 68.
Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319-20. The Court noted that Congress, after long consideration, had seen fit to impose such liability on the United States. /d.
283. /d. at 319 (footnote omitted).
284. /d. at 320 (footnote omitted).
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
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Rayonier, the validity of Dalehite was questioned by courts and commentators. 285 Believing the Dalehite Court had overbroadly interpreted the
discretionary function exception, courts sought to narrow its application.286 In 1984, however, the Court reaffirmed Dalehite in no uncertain
terms in United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines). 287 Responding to the claim that cases such as Indian
Towing had "eroded, if not overruled" Dalehite, the Court flatly rejected
the "supposition that Dalehite no longer represents a valid interpretation
of the discretionary function exception. " 288
In Varig, the Court reviewed two cases involving negligence by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in certifying commercial aircraft. In both cases, aircraft certified by the FAA as airworthy caught
fire mid-air when non-regulation equipment failed to operate or was
missing. The FAA had not inspected the aircraft itself; instead, the FAA
had delegated inspection responsibility to aircraft manufacturers and implemented a "spot-check" program to ensure manufacturer compliance
with FAA safety regulations. The plaintiffs alleged that the FAA was
negligent in delegating inspection responsibilities, implementing the spotcheck program, and issuing airworthiness certificates to the two aircraft
even though they had not met existing fire protection standards. 289
The Court held that the discretionary function exception immunized
the FAA from tort liability for all three negligent acts. 290 The Court
held that the exception protected both the FAA officials who designed
the system of compliance review and the employees who carried out the
"spot-check" program in accordance with agency directives. 291 The
Court reasoned that the FAA is a government regulatory agency which
merely polices aircraft manufacturers by monitoring their compliance
with FAA regulations. The Court noted that the development, implementation, and execution of a "spot-check" program is exactly the sort
of discretionary governmental function Section 2680(a) was designed to
protect from judicial "second-guessing," 292 and without such protection,
285. See, e.g., Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Although
Dalehite remains an important statement of the policy behind the discretionary
function exemption, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and various circuit
courts have operated to narrow Dalehite's definition of the term 'discretion.'"); see
also Fishback & Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 296-97 (198889) [hereinafter Fishback & Killefer, Discretionary Function].
286. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 995-98 (6th Cir. 1975) (mere exercise of
judgment does not insulate government from liability for its employees' torts; only
those activities which entail formulation of governmental policy are protected); see
also Fishback & Killefer, Discretionary Function, supra note 285, at 296.
287. 467 u.s. 797 (1984).
288. /d. at 811-12.
289. /d. at 801-03.
290. /d. at 815-16.
291. /d. at 819-20.
292. /d. at 814-15.
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efficient government operations would be seriously hampered. 293
The Court pointed to the legislative history of Section 2680(a) in
support of its decision. Like the Dalehite Court, the Varig Court found
persuasive the House Report which stated that "claims against Federal
agencies growing out of their regulatory activities" are clearly exempted
from the waiver of sovereign immunity. 294 Additionally, the Court reasoned that protecting regulatory activities from suit upholds Congress'
underlying purpose in enacting the discretionary function exception.
"Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. " 295 Thus, while the Court
acknowledged that its interpretation of the FTCA and the discretionary
function exception had not "followed a straight line," the Court chose to
reaffirm its prior interpretation of Section 2680(a) in Dalehite. 296
As in Dalehite, the Varig Court stressed the importance of the discretionary function exception in marking the boundary between Congress' desire to waive immunity when governmental wrongs cause injury,
and its desire to protect the government when those wrongs are the result
of policy decisions, no matter how misbegotten or negligent-2 97 In addition, as in Dalehite, the Court found it "unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define with precision every contour of the discretionary
function exception. " 298
Although the Court was unwilling, and seemingly unable, to define
the parameters of government activity that is discretionary, it did lay out
two factors to guide lower courts. First, "it is the nature of the conduct,
rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case." 299 Thus, the exception
protects all government employees, whatever their rank or job, if their
acts are of "the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from
tort liability." 300 According to the Court, determining whether an employee's acts are the kind to trigger the exception should be the basis of a
court's inquiry. 301 Unfortunately, the Court provided little guidance in
how to get beyond the semantics to answer that question. Second, at a
minimum, the exception immunizes the "discretionary acts of the government acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals."302 As the Court asserted,
293. /d. at 814 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1993)).
294. /d. at 810 (emphasis supplied in Varig) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. I, 8 (1942)).
295. !d. at 814.
296. /d. at 811-12.
297. !d. at 808.
298. !d. at 813.
299. /d.
300. !d.
301. !d.
302. /d.
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Decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations directly affect the feasibility and practicality of the government's regulatory program; such decisions require the agency to establish
priorities for the accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding. . . . Judicial
intervention in such decisionmaking through private tort suits
would require the courts to "second-guess" the political, social,
and economic judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory
function. It was precisely this sort of judicial intervention in
policy making that the discretionary function exception was
designed to prevent. 303
Thus, in Varig, the FAA's determination of how to supervise the safety
procedures of airplane manufacturers was the exercise of discretionary
authority of the "most basic kind," and was thus protected by governmental immunity.304

E.

Berkovitz and the Restriction of Dalehite

Following Varig, the scope of the discretionary function exception
was unclear. Some courts adopted a narrow reading of the exception,
reasoning that all decisions made by government employees involve some
element of discretion, and that a broad interpretation would virtually
swallow the waiver of immunity-a result Congress could not have intended. 305 Other courts adopted a broad reading of the exception on the
theory that waivers of immunity are strictly construed in favor of the
sovereign and that exceptions to such waivers should accordingly receive
a generous construction. 306
303. ld. at 819-20.
304. Jd. at 820.
305. See, e.g., Alabama Elec. Coop. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1530-31 (lith Cir.
1985) (rejecting a broad application of the exception and holding that the discretionary function exception does not per se insulate the government from liability for
negligent design of a flood control project).
Alabama Electric is, however, something of an anomaly among post-Varig
cases. See Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Where the
challenged governmental activity involves safety considerations under an established policy rather than the balancing of competing public policy considerations,
the rationale for the exception falls away and the United States will be held responsible for the negligence of its employees."); see also Fishback & Killefer, Discretionary Function, supra note 285, at 319-21 (criticizing Alabama Electric approach as
based on an "incorrect" underlying premise that scientific or technical decisions do
not implicate policy concerns and noting that the case is "almost certainly inconsistent with the thrust of other post-Varig cases").
306. See, e.g., General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 248 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that negligent design claim involving the Three Mile Island nuclear
power facility was barred by the discretionary function exception), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1228 (1985); George v. United States, 703 F.2d 90, 92 (4th Cir. 1983) (barring
plaintiffs' claims that the government's failure to prohibit use of fuel system, made
of two different metals, in aircraft resulted in system rusting and causing crash). See
generally Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and Mandatory Regula-
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In analyzing the discretionary function exception, some courts considered a number of factors, including the existence of objective standards against which to judge the conduct, 307 the extent to which the
conduct involves public policy considerations, 308 the extent to which a
waiver of liability would affect government programming, and the extent
to which such a waiver would involve courts in political, economic, and
social decisions. 309 The weight given these factors was determined on a
case-by-case basis and many of the decisions appeared outcome oriented.
Recently, the Supreme Court went a long way toward clarifying the
scope of the discretionary function exception in Berkovitz v. United
States. 310 Berkovitz involved allegations that the Bureau of Biologics of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) wrongfully released to the
public a contaminated polio vaccine lot, and that the National Institute
of Health's Division of Biologic Standards (DBS) acted wrongfully in
licensing the manufacturer of the vaccine. These acts of negligence allegedly resulted in a three-month-old infant contracting a severe case of polio that left the child almost completely paralyzed and unable to breathe
without a respirator. 311
In Berkovitz, the Court began its inquiry into the applicability of the
discretionary function exception by examining the nature of the conduct
at issue, not the status of the actor. 312 Thus, the actor's membership in
the executive branch of government, for example, had no bearing on the
existence of the exception. The Court then created a two-part analysis to
determine whether a government employee's conduct is discretionary.
First, a court must consider whether the conduct 'at issue involves a matter of judgment or choice. If there is no choice involved-if a federal
statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action
which the employee failed to follow-the discretionary function exception will not apply and the analysis ends. 313 If the challenged conduct
involves some element of choice, then the court passes to the second part
of the analysis and determines whether the choice or judgment represents
a decision based on considerations of public policy. 314 If so, the government is immune from suit; if not, there will be no bar to government
liability. "In sum, the discretionary function exception insulates the gov-

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

tions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1300, 1320-23 (1987); Fishback & Killefer, Discretionary
Function, supra note 285, at 298-300, 303-21.
See Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 219
(1963)).
/d.
Id.
486 u.s. 531 ( 1988).
/d. at 583.
/d. at 536 (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viaca Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984)).
/d.
Id. at 537 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953)) ("Where there
is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.").
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ernment from liability if the action challenged in the case involves the
permissible exercise of policy judgment." 315
The foregoing analysis resulted in a unanimous decision in favor of
the plaintiffs in Berkovitz, and thus in a conclusion that the discretionary
function exception did not apply. 316 FDA regulations empowered, but
did not require, the FDA to examine and prevent the distribution of noncomplying lots of the vaccine. Plaintiffs alleged that under the authority
of these regulations, the FDA adopted a policy of testing all lots for compliance with safety standards, and that notwithstanding this policy, the
FDA failed to test the lot in question and released it for public consumption. The Court held that the discretionary function exception did not
bar a claim based upon the failure of FDA officials to test the lot in
question, since FDA policy required the testing and left officials with no
matter of choice or judgment.3I 7
Similarly, the Court held that the discretionary function exception
did not bar that portion of the claim based upon the decision to license
the manufacturer. The plaintiffs alleged that DBS issued the license
without receiving test data required by statutes and regulations as a precondition to licensure. Under these circumstances, the statutory framework provided no room for choice or judgment and the discretionary
function exception did not apply. 318
Berkovitz restricted the Varig expansion of the discretionary function exception. In "restating and clarifying" the exception's scope, the
Court "specifically ... reject[ed] the government's argument that the
exception precludes liability for any and all acts arising out of the regulatory programs of federal agencies." 319 In quashing the government's attempt to further expand the exception to immunize all governmental
regulatory activity per se, the Court narrowed its previous interpretation
of the language and legislative history of the exception. 320 The Court
also relied on its prior decisions in Indian Towing and Rayonier in rejecting immunity for "core" or "uniquely governmental functions." 321
F.

Post-Berkovitz· Toward a Narrower Reading of "Discretionary
Function"

The Berkovitz narrowing of the discretionary function exception and
the resurrection of Indian Towing suggest a limitation of Varig princi315. /d.
316. /d. at 544-45.
317. /d. at 544 ("When a suit charges an agency with failing to act in accord with a
specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception does not apply.").
318. ld. at 542-44.
319. ld. at 538 ("To the extent we have not already put the Government's argument to
rest, we do so now. The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct
that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment."). ld. at 539.
320. Id. at 538-39.
321. /d. at 539 n.5.
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pies, as illustrated by post-Berkovitz cases. 322 In McMichael v. United
States, 323 for example, claims were filed against the United States under
the FfCA seeking damages for injuries and deaths resulting from a
munitions plant explosion which occurred during an electrical storm.
The plant's safety regulations required that the plant be evacuated during
electrical storms. 324 The district court found that the government was
negligent in failing to enforce the safety standards of the plant, and held
that the discretionary function exception did not bar the plaintiff's
claim. 325 Applying Berkovitz, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision, holding that the government inspectors did not exercise
discretion since evacuating the plant was mandated by safety
regulations. 326
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Ayala v. Joy Manufacturing Company. 327 In Ayala, plaintiffs brought wrongful death suits
against the government for negligent inspection of a continuous coal
mining machine which caused a methane and coal dust explosion in a
Colorado coal mine. The district court, relying on Varig, held that the
regulatory inspection came under the discretionary function exception
and dismissed the action. 328 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, citing
Berkovitz and McMichael, reversed the district court's decision, and held
that the conduct of the government mining inspector "involved no discretion or policy making choices." 329

G.

Conclusion

The holdings in Berkovitz, McMichael and Ayala suggest a move
away from Varig's unwarranted expansion of the discretionary function
exception and clearly provide a better framework for analysis of this exception in the future. 330 While there remains some confusion over the
scope of the discretionary function exception, 331 the Supreme Court ap322. See, e.g., Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 877 F.2d 846 (lOth Cir. 1989); McMichael v.
United States, 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988). Cf Patterson v. United States, 856
F.2d 670 (1988) (holding that an alleged negligent inspection of a fire site by officials
from the Office of Surface Mining was not within the discretionary function exception), vacated, 881 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (reinstating the district court's
decision to dismiss the FfCA claim).
323. 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988).
324. /d. at 1030.
325. /d. at 1030-31.
326. /d. at 1033. "(T]he particular violation at issue here did not involve the weighing of
any facts or policies and was therefore not discretionary." /d. at 1033-34 n.8 (citing
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988)).
327. 877 F.2d 846 (lOth Cir. 1989).
328. /d. at 848.
329. /d. at 848-49.
330. See supra notes 305-329 and accompanying text.
331. For example, see Patterson v. United States, 856 F.2d 670 (1988), vacated, 881 F.2d
127 (4th Cir. 1989) (en bane). In Patterson, residents of a house built on a subterranean coal refuse pile were injured or killed after inhaling smoke and noxious gases
when an above-ground fire ignited the refuse pile below. One year before their inju-
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pears to be trimming back its previous expansion of the exception in accord with Congress' purpose in enacting both the FTCA and its
exceptions. Other courts should follow the Court's analysis and bar only
those claims where the negligent governmental acts involve actual public
policy considerations.
VI.

SUMMARY

Although the FTCA undoubtedly provided and continues to provide much needed relief to countless individuals, numerous claims still go
without adequate remedy because the FTCA immunity waiver is only
partial. Judicial expansion of explicit exceptions, and the judicial crearies, the plaintiffs had complained of the problem to the Federal Office of Surface
Mining (OSM). An OSM inspector had visited the site but no action was taken.
The plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were caused by the negligent OSM inspections. Patterson, 856 F.2d at 671. The government responded that the acts of the
OSM field investigator were "discretionary" and thus protected by section 2680(a).
A three-member panel of the Fourth Circuit disagreed. While acknowledging
that the inspector's investigation "inevitably require[s] some decision-making," the
court concluded that the type of discretion is not of the nature and quality to trigger
the exception. Id. at 674. Specifically, the court found that field investigators do
not have the authority to make policy decisions or even recommendations as to final
disposition of the complaint. Thus, because the inspector's acts were not discretionary, the exception did not apply. /d. This was true even though the plaintiffs did
not allege that the inspector had disregarded specific and mandatory inspection
guidelines, as in Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), or that OSM acted
negligently in finding that no emergency situation warranting the expenditure of
funds existed. Patterson, 856 F.2d at 671, 674. The court, relying on the Supreme
Court's recent narrowing of the discretionary function in Berkovitz, specifically rejected the Dalehite operation/planning distinction as "either too simplistic or too
complicated and specious." /d. at 673. The court seemed comfortable waiving immunity for low-level negligence, but hesitant to waive immunity for "high-altitude"
decisions.
On rehearing, however, after considering the evidence presented on re-examination, the Fourth Circuit, en bane, found that the OSM's final decision that no
emergency existed which warranted the expenditure of emergency funds was a discretionary one. Patterson, 881 F.2d at 128. In vacating the panel opinion, the court
did not address the issues raised by Berkovitz. The court's reasoning, while difficult
to determine, appears to be based on a factual finding from the record, and should
not be construed as a retreat from Berkovitz principles. See also Piechowicz v.
United States, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
In Piechowicz, two would-be witnesses in a criminal trial were murdered after
receiving threats not to testify. The witnesses had reported the threats to the Assistant U.S. Attorney and the DEA agent in charge of the case, but neither official had
offered the witnesses protection. The plaintiffs sued the government and the two
officials for failing to place the witnesses in the Witness Security Program. /d. at
1210.
The Fourth Circuit held that federal witness protection statutes and regulations
grant agents in charge of a case "considerable latitude to decide whether and how to
protect witnesses." /d. at 1212. The decision whether to offer witnesses federal
protection was a matter of choice and discretion "involving the permissible exercise" of public policy considerations. Id. at 1211 (quoting Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988)). Therefore, the officials' failure to provide protection passed both parts of the Berkovitz test, and triggered application of the discretionary function exception. See supra notes 310-315 and accompanying text.
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tion of others, have led to a reservation of immunity far beyond that
originally intended by Congress. In some situations, courts have enlarged exceptions to the point where the rule has been swallowed and the
waiver of immunity rendered meaningless. Judicial restraint in interpreting the exceptions should be encouraged and Congress should recognize
and remedy overbroad judicial construction by amendment and clearer
statutory definitions.
Thoughtful counsel must remain aware of the government's reserved immunity and should attempt to couch claims in language falling
within the waiver of immunity, rather than within a reservation. For
example, claims for injuries sustained in an assault or battery at the
hands of a government employee should be framed in terms of his superiors' negligence in hiring, supervising and training him, and where the
government has a duty to control the wrongdoer's conduct independent
of the employment relationship, this should be stated. Similarly, cases
impacted by the foreign country exception should focus on those negligent acts or omissions which occurred in the United States and be framed
as "headquarters claims." Fe res claims should be pleaded so as to make
clear that no challenge to military discipline is intended. And all claims,
where possible, should avoid challenge to governmental policy decisions
and should instead focus on actions or failures to act that are violative of
established policies and procedures.
Counsel also must be aware of the varied treatment accorded the
reservations of immunity by the various circuits and should make every
effort to present claims in the most favorable forum. For example, the
Fourth Circuit has proved unreceptive to narrow constructions of the
Feres doctrine and the intentional tort and discretionary function exceptions, while the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have taken the opposite tact. Finally, counsel must be aware that administrative remedies
may be available for meritorious claims, even where suit is barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Benefits available under the Veterans'
Benefits Act, the Military Claims Act, the Foreign Claims Act, and similar statutes sometimes provide meaningful administrative remedies where
none exist at law.

